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Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters that analyze the fragility of financial
institutions. All chapters are based on joint work with my friend and col-
league Paul Schempp. The analysis is concerned with self-fulfilling crises that
are associated with maturity transformation and liquidity provision by finan-
cial intermediaries. The need for such services arises because, on the one
hand, investors such as consumers or firms have a demand for liquid assets
and, on the other hand, investment projects require stable long-term funding.
Banks are institutions that can efficiently intermediate in such an environ-
ment. However, when illiquid long-term projects are financed with short-term
debt such as demand-deposits, strategic complementarity may arise between
those agents that hold short-term claims. Thus, maturity mismatch makes
banks potentially prone to self-fulfilling liquidity crises, i.e., panic-based bank
runs or rollover freezes may become possible. The important questions that
arise in this context are: Under which conditions does the risk of self-fulfilling
liquidity crises arise? And, how can such fragility be best dealt with?
In this thesis, we show that the government has a distinct role in ensuring
the functioning of efficient maturity transformation and liquidity provision
(Chapter 1). We also show that if a single government’s fiscal power is limited,
supranational agreements can help to mitigate this limitation (Chapter 2).
Finally, we show that in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, certain types of
governmental interventions become ineffective altogether (Chapter 3).
Chapter 1 is based on Luck and Schempp (2014b) and discusses the optimal
provision of liquidity. It asks whether financial intermediaries can optimally
provide liquidity, or whether the government has a role in creating liquidity by
supplying government securities. We discuss a model in which intermediaries
optimally manage liquidity with outside rather than inside liquidity: instead
of holding liquid real assets that can be used at will, banks sell claims on long-
term projects to investors when liquid funds are needed. While increasing effi-
ciency, liquidity management with private outside liquidity is associated with
a rollover risk. This rollover risk either keeps intermediaries from providing
liquidity optimally, or it makes the economy inherently fragile. In contrast
to privately produced claims, government bonds are not associated with co-
ordination problems unless there is a prospect of the government defaulting.
Therefore, efficiency and stability can be enhanced if liquidity management
relies on public outside liquidity.
The main results of the first chapter are derived under the assumption
1
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that a government cannot default because it can commit future liquidity via
taxation. It is thus the only institution that can credibly promise to provide
liquidity in the future. However, this ability depends on the assumption that
the government has access to a sufficiently large and stable tax base. In the
next chapter, we assume that the tax base is endogenous and depends to some
degree on the performance of the financial sector.
Chapter 2 is based on Luck and Schempp (2014c) and provides a model that
unifies the notion of self-fulfilling banking crises and sovereign debt crises. In
this model, a bank run can be contagious by triggering a sovereign default,
and vice versa. A deposit insurance scheme can eliminate the adverse equilib-
rium only if the government can repay its debt and credibly insure deposits,
irrespective of the performance of the financial sector. Moreover, we analyze
how banking crises and sovereign defaults can be contagious across countries.
We give conditions under which the implementation of a banking union, in-
cluding a supranational deposit insurance, prevents crises effectively and at
no cost. Finally, we discuss the current proposals for a banking union in the
euro area and argue that it should be extended by a supranational Deposit
Guarantee Scheme.
Throughout the first two chapters, we abstract from regulatory require-
ments and the incentive to circumvent such. This assumption is relaxed in
Chapter 3, which is based on Luck and Schempp (2015). We study a banking
model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the
coexistence of unregulated shadow banking and regulated commercial bank-
ing. As in Chapter 1, optimal intermediation relies on outside liquidity. While
a deposit insurance and a capital requirement can ensure the stability of the
commercial banking sector in this setup, panic-based runs are possible in the
shadow banking sector. We then emphasize a new channel through which
these runs are contagious, affecting the regulated banking sector: Because a
run on shadow banks induces fire sales, the wholesale funding conditions for
regulated banks may also deteriorate via a binding cash-in-the-market con-
straint. We use the model to argue that regulatory arbitrage poses a threat
to the stability of regulated banks, even in the absence of explicit or implicit
contractual linkages between regulated and non-regulated banking. This is
important, as most reforms after the 2007-09 financial crisis have targeted
explicit or implicit contractual linkages between the two sectors, often under
the premise that this is an effective measure for shielding regulated commer-
cial banks from turmoil in the shadow banking sector. We indicate that more
regulatory measures may be desirable, particularly restrictions on wholesale
funding. We discuss the liquidity regulation proposed in Basel III and argue
2
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that a more macro-prudential set of rules would be an improvement.
All three chapters are concerned with the self-fulfilling elements of financial
crises. We find that the government has a distinct role in dealing with such
fragilities. During the 2007-09 financial crisis, fiscal authorities and central
banks tried to stabilize the financial system by engaging in bail-outs and
by providing guarantees and liquidity assistance for distressed institutions.
While such ex-post measures can be useful once a financial system is in a
state of crisis, this thesis contributes to the understanding of how ex-ante
measures can or cannot prevent such crises in the first place. This thesis
presents and analyzes models which indicate that a fiscally strong government
can ensure efficient liquidity provision by issuing government bonds. If a
single country is fiscally weak, we show how a banking union that includes
a supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme may be mutually beneficial for
its participants. Finally, we show how regulatory arbitrage can reintroduce
panic-based runs in an economy in which the banking sector is covered by a
safety net. We show that panics in the shadow banking sector may affect the
regulated banking sector even the absence of contractual linkages between the
sectors. This indicates that regulatory arbitrage may pose a severe restriction
on the government’s ability to stabilize the banking system.
3

1
Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and
Government Bonds
1.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that investors value the liquidity of government
bonds (see, e.g., Longstaff, 2004; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).
There are various explanations for why incomplete financial markets and fi-
nancial frictions give rise to a demand for liquidity, and for government secu-
rities as means to provide such liquidity. Government bonds may be valuable
to investors as a simple medium of transfer across time, e.g., to enhance risk-
sharing (see, e.g., Gale, 1990) or to improve investment by alleviating frictions
(see, e.g., Woodford, 1990; Saint-Paul, 2005). Demand for government secu-
rities may especially arise when private liquidity provision is limited, e.g., if
moral hazard and commitment problems restrict the pledgeable income of
private agents. Publicly issued claims may guarantee the provision of liq-
uidity and reduce the need to set liquid real assets aside (Holmström and
Tirole, 1998, 2011). Moreover, it lies in the nature of government bonds that
they mitigate the adverse selection problems typically associated with liq-
uidity provision because they are free from private information (Gorton and
Pennacchi, 1990; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2013).
This chapter provides a simple but novel explanation for why government
securities are especially suited to manage liquidity needs: government securi-
ties are less prone to coordination failures than privately issued claims, i.e.,
less exposed to rollover risk.
In the run-up to the recent financial crisis, financial intermediaries satisfied
liquidity needs by transforming long-term real investments into liquid claims
instead of setting liquid real assets aside. However, when the crisis unfolded
as a consequence of various shocks in the housing market, privately produced
assets stopped being liquid – leaving financial markets and intermediaries in
5
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turmoil.1 The crisis ultimately appears as an inability of the private sector
to provide liquidity efficiently to the economy.
In our model, financial intermediaries2 optimally provide liquidity not
through holding liquid real assets that can be used at will (inside liquidity).
Instead, they optimally rely on liquidity that investors provide in exchange for
claims on future returns of long-term real investments (referred to as private
outside liquidity). The key friction of our model is that at the time of initial
investment, it impossible to contract with the potential providers of private
outside liquidity such as wholesale funding. While the reliance on outside
liquidity increases profitable long-term investment, it may be also associated
with a rollover risk. We argue that this rollover risk is inherent in liquidity
management with privately produced claims. We show that the rollover risk
may either make intermediaries refrain from providing liquidity optimally in
the first place, or it may make the economy inherently fragile. In turn, under
the assumption that the government never defaults, public claims are free
from such risk. Satisfying liquidity needs by selling government securities in
exchange for outside liquidity (referred to as public outside liquidity) may
thus enhance efficiency and stability.
We derive our results from a banking model in the tradition of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983, henceforth D&D). Demand for liquid assets arises from
an idiosyncratic liquidity risk on the part of consumers. Financial interme-
diaries provide optimal risk-sharing to consumers by offering demand-deposit
contracts. However, we alter the D&D setup by assuming that banks can sell
claims on their future returns to investors in the interim period in exchange
for outside liquidity. Banks use the proceeds to serve early withdrawing con-
sumers. This model feature is reminiscent of Holmström and Tirole (1998,
2011) and Bolton et al. (2011).
The model’s implications are the following: First, the presence of investors
who may buy claims on future returns generally allows a reduction of the
holdings of liquid real assets in order to manage liquidity. Banks can conduct
more productive, but illiquid long-term investments. Second, we find that
intermediaries might not be able to manage liquidity optimally with privately
produced claims. Relying on outside liquidity by investors in exchange for
privately produced claims exposes an intermediary to the risk of a rollover
freeze. There is strategic complementarity between investors in their decisions
1See, e.g., Hellwig (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Krishnamurthy (2010), and Caballero
(2010).
2We use the terms “bank” and “financial intermediary” interchangeably throughout the
chapter.
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to purchase claims on intermediaries’ future returns. If no investor purchases
claims, the intermediary will be forced to conduct costly liquidation. This in
turn may make it optimal to refuse a rollover. Importantly, the rollover risk
– unlike the classical bank run problem – cannot be eliminated by a classic
deposit insurance or by a suspension of convertibility. This caused by the
friction that outside liquidity is not contractible in the initial period. The
potential rollover freeze in turn may make intermediaries either reluctant to
implement the first-best, or it may make the economy inherently fragile.
As a third result, we show that in the presence of potential coordination
failures between investors, the existence of public claims increases welfare.
These claims allow intermediaries to implement the optimal allocation with-
out exposing the economy to the risk of a rollover freeze. The reason is simple:
under the assumption that the government never defaults, government secu-
rities are never subject to a coordination problem, i.e., there is no strategic
complementarity between the investors in their decisions to purchase govern-
ment bonds. In contrast to privately produced assets, the value of government
securities is independent of the decision of investors to purchase the security
or not. By using government bonds to manage liquidity, banks can reduce in-
efficient reliance on inside liquidity while avoiding rollover risk. Consequently,
government borrowing may have non-Ricardian effects (see, e.g., Barro, 1974).
Finally, we discuss the assumption that the government can always repay
its debt. We show that once the government’s ability to repay depends on
the banking sector, a run on the banking sector may be complemented by a
run on government debt if there is public supply of liquidity. In this case,
the positive effects of public liquidity provision may vanish. We analyze the
interplay of sovereign defaults and banking crises in more depth in Chapter 2.
We use the term “outside liquidity” in the sense of Holmström and Tirole
(2011), Bolton et al. (2011), and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012). The concept
of inside and outside liquidity is to some degree reminiscent to the definition
of inside and outside money (see, e.g., Lagos, 2006), but there are subtle
differences. Outside money is money that is not anyone’s liability, and that
is thus a net asset for the private sector. In contrast, inside money is created
within the private sector, and is thus some private agent’s liability. Similarly,
inside liquidity is the liquidity that is created within a specified sector, while
outside liquidity is supplied by agents or institutions outside this sector. In
contrast to the definition of outside money, outside liquidity is mostly defined
“from the point of view of the financial sector”.3 In Bolton et al. (2011), inside
liquidity denotes the intermediary’s cash reserves, whereas the intermediary
3Definition in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012); other definitions are similar.
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can raise outside liquidity by selling assets to long-term investors (hedge funds
and pension funds). Thus, outside liquidity is the label for liquidity that
investors supply to banks (and thus to consumers).
This chapter is closely related to the literature on the government’s role in
providing safe assets for the purpose of liquidity management. As in the sem-
inal paper by Holmström and Tirole (1998), we allow the economy to reduce
the holdings of real assets and to issue claims on future returns in order to
manage liquidity needs. In contrast to Holmström and Tirole, the limitation
of private liquidity supply originates not from agency problems, but from co-
ordination problems. In terms of our results, this chapter is close to a series of
recent papers (Greenwood et al., 2012; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2012; Gorton
and Ordoñez, 2013). With Gorton and Ordoñez (2013), we share the notion
that government bonds are more liquid than privately produced assets and
make the economy more stable. However, their reasoning is based on the infor-
mation sensitivity of assets.4 They show that liquidity provision by privately
produced assets may make an economy fragile, as seemingly safe assets may
become illiquid when they become information-sensitive. Government bonds
in turn are less information-sensitive and thus more liquid. With the paper by
Greenwood et al. (2012) we have in common that the government has a com-
parative advantage in bearing refinancing risk relative to the private sector,
and thus public provision of liquidity is welfare-enhancing. However, their fo-
cus is on the maturity of different securities. Finally, Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2012) provide a macroeconomic model with inside and outside liquidity. As
in our setup, a crisis occurs when private liquidity provision is insufficient and
the role of public securities for financial stability is emphasized.
The results of this chapter can also be interpreted in the light of the theory
of liquidity mismatch. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) argue that maturity trans-
formation and the associated maturity mismatch are not problematic per se.
Fragility arises only if maturity transformation also induces a liquidity mis-
match. While financing a 20 year government bond with demand deposits
is an extreme form of maturity mismatch, it does not constitute a liquidity
mismatch as long as there is a liquid market for government bonds. In our
model, the government bonds on the banks’ balance sheets neither change
the mechanism of maturity transformation nor the liquidity mismatch, but it
substantially reduces the liquidity mismatch.
We also relate our results to recent empirical findings. In our model, liq-
uidity benefits from government bonds have real effects, consistent with the
4See Dang et al. (2013a) and Dang et al. (2013b) on information (in)sensitivity of assets
and financial crises.
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evidence that investors value these attributes (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2012). Moreover, public provision of liquidity reduces the fragility
in our setup, which is in line with the finding that financial crises are more
likely when little public debt is available (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2013) and financial crises seem to be related to excessive private debt rather
than public debt (Jordà et al., 2013; Schularick, 2014).
This chapter is also very closely related to theories of banking, in which
intermediaries optimally rely less on inside liquidity and more on sales of
claims on long-term investments, such as the model by Bolton et al. (2011).
This model is concerned with the timing of trade in the presence of uncertainty
and asymmetric information, while we focus on the coordination failures that
may be associated with outside liquidity.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on liquidity provision by
financial intermediaries. D&D have argued that financial intermediaries can
provide optimal risk-sharing to consumers and allow them to benefit from
profitable long-term investments by offering demand-deposit contracts.5 In
contrast, we argue that the ability of financial intermediaries to provide liq-
uidity is limited. We are far from being the first to address the problems
of liquidity provision by intermediaries. The banking literature has already
produced various arguments. It has been argued that the ability of banks
to provide risk-sharing in the presence of financial markets is very limited
(Jacklin, 1987; Farhi et al., 2009).6 Especially when consumers are able to
adjust their portfolio, liquidity provision may be harmed (von Thadden, 1998).
Moreover, banks may be unable to implement the first-best through demand-
deposit contracts in the presence of macroeconomic interest rate risk (Hellwig,
1994).7 Under aggregate risk and in the presences of moral hazard, financial
intermediaries may not be able to insure firms against liquidity shocks either
(Holmström and Tirole, 1998). The creation of liquidity through interbank
trade may also be limited if banks are unable to diversify the liquidity risk of
their consumers (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987).
Our argument, however, is neither based on agency problems nor on aggre-
gate uncertainty. We argue that liquidity management with privately issued
claims creates a coordination problem between those investors who could pro-
vide liquidity. A memorable insight from the seminal contributions by Bryant
(1980) and D&D is that liquidity provision may be associated with the exis-
5On the optimality of intermediaries of liquidity provider, see also, e.g., Gorton and Pen-
nacchi (1990), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2001), and Kashyap
et al. (2002).
6See also Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004).
7See also Allen and Gale (1998) on this point.
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tence of run equilibria and make an economy inherently fragile.8 Importantly,
the rollover problem in our setup differs from the classical bank run problem.
We show that the coordination problem cannot be eliminated by a deposit
insurance nor by a suspension of convertibility. Ultimately, the rollover risk
associated with optimal private liquidity provision may prevent the imple-
mentation of the optimal allocation in the first place. This chapter stands
in contrast to models arguing that banks are especially suited to provide liq-
uidity because of their fragile capital structure. Amongst others, Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001, 2005) argue that the frag-
ile nature of bank balance sheets disciplines bank managers and thus allows
overcoming commitment problems associated with liquidity provision. In con-
trast, we argue that the potential rollover risk may cause banks to refrain from
supplying liquidity in an optimal fashion in the first place.
We proceed as follows: In Section 1.2, we introduce the general setup and
derive the first-best allocation and show how it can be implemented by banks.
In Section 1.3, we investigate how the first-best and its implementation change
if we introduce outside liquidity. Section 1.4 shows how the rollover risk
associated with privately liquidity supply influences the stability and efficiency
of banks. Finally, in Section 1.5, we demonstrate why the provision of public
liquidity by the government is superior to the private case.
1.2 Intermediation with Inside Liquidity
Consider an economy that goes through a sequence of three dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
There is a single good that can be used for consumption as well as for invest-
ment. Moreover, there are two investment technologies that we refer to as
assets. The economy is populated by risk-averse consumers who face an id-
iosyncratic liquidity risk.
Consumers
There is a continuum of ex ante identical consumers with mass one. Each
consumer is endowed with e0 units of the good in t = 0. There are two types
of consumers, denoted by θi ∈ {0, 1}. The type determines the consumer’s
8Following the seminal contributions by Bryant and Diamond and Dybvig, a vast literature
on bank runs evolved. See, e.g., the literature regarding information-based runs (Jacklin
and Bhattacharya, 1988), models with positive probability of bank runs (Postlewaite
and Vives, 1987; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Allen and Gale, 1998; Rochet and
Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), models with interbank contagion (Allen
and Gale, 2000; Dasgupta, 2004; Uhlig, 2010), runs in repurchase agreements (Martin
et al., 2014a), and dynamic runs (He and Xiong, 2012).
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intertemporal preference for consumption in periods one and two. With prob-
ability pi, consumer i is an “impatient consumer” who needs to consume in
t = 1, denoted by θi = 1. With probability (1 − pi), she is a “patient con-
sumer” who is indifferent between consumption at both dates, denoted by
θi = 0. Initially, consumers do not know their type; their probability of being
type 1 is identical and independent. In period one, each consumer privately
learns his type. This private revelation can be considered as a liquidity shock.
A consumption profile (c1, c2) gives a consumer i a utility of
U(c1, c2, θi) = θiu(c1) + (1− θi)u(c1 + c2), (1.1)
where the “baseline” utility u : R+ → R is an increasing and strictly concave
function that is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies Inada condi-
tions, u′(0) = +∞ and u′(+∞) = 0. For each consumer, the ex-ante expected
utility is given by EU(c1, c2) = piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c1 + c2).
Notice that the attributes “patient” and “impatient” characterize the con-
sumer’s exogenous type which determines his preference, denoted by θi. In
contrast, the attributes “late” and “early” will characterize the timing of con-
sumption which is endogenous: An “early consumer” consumes in t = 1, while
a “late consumer” consumes in t = 2.
Assets
There are two different assets (investment technologies) available in t = 0: a
short asset (storage technology), and a long asset (production technology).
The short asset transforms one unit of the good at time t into one unit of
the good at t + 1, effectively storing the good. The long asset promises a
higher expected return in the long run. However, this asset is considered to
be illiquid as it can only be liquidated with a substantial discount in t = 1.
The long asset is represented by a continuum of investment projects. An
investment project is a metaphor for an entrepreneur who is endowed with a
production technology but has no endowment of goods for investment. Each
consumer has access to exactly one project (or equivalently is matched with
exactly one entrepreneur). Each investment project yields a stochastic return
of Ri units in t = 2 for each unit invested in t = 0. The return Ri is the
realization of an independently and identically distributed random variable
R˜, characterized by a probability distribution F . F is continuous and strictly
increasing on a compact interval with minimum R > 0 and maximum R, with
E[Ri] = R > 1. We assume that the realization of an investment project’s
long-term return Ri is privately revealed to the project’s financier in t = 1. As
we will shortly see, the idiosynchratic risk implies that financial intermediaries
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dominate a financial markets solution in terms of welfare.
Finally, an investment project may be physically liquidated prematurely at
a rate ` ∈ (0, 1/R) in t = 1, yielding a liquidation return of `Ri units. The
liquidation return of a project thus depends on the project’s stochastic long-
term return. However, the ratio of liquidation return to long-term return is
constant and equal to `.
1.2.1 First-Best Allocation
The allocation of consumption across different consumer types and different
periods is denoted by {c1(θ), c2(θ)}θ∈{0,1}. The unconstrained optimum results
from the social planner’s first-best problem, which is given by
max
{c1(θ),c2(θ)}θ∈{0,1}
piu(c1(1)) + (1− pi)u(c1(0) + c2(0)) (1.2)
subject to
pi
(
c1(1) +
c2(1)
R
)
+ (1− pi)
(
c1(0) +
c2(0)
R
)
≤ e0. (1.3)
Equation (1.3) is the feasibility condition, resulting from the initial investment
constraint in t = 0 and the two budget constraints in period one and two.
In the first-best, it holds that
c2(1) = c1(0) = 0. (1.4)
The late consumption levels of patient and the early consumption level of
impatient consumers are then given by the following first-order condition and
budget constraint:
u′(c1(1)) = Ru′(c2(0)), (1.5)
pic1(1) + (1− pi)c2(0)
R
= e0. (1.6)
The optimal allocation is thus characterized by the trade-off between insur-
ance against liquidity risk (investment in storage) and productive investment
(investment in the long assets).
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1.2.2 Diamond & Dybvig (1983)
The model described above resembles the essential features of the framework
of the D&D model. Therefore, we briefly review the key results of the seminal
D&D model. The first important result is that a competitive financial market
generally fails to implement the first-best allocation. In contrast, a competi-
tive banking sector or a representative bank can implement the first-best. It
is assumed that the law of large numbers applies on the bank level. That is,
there is neither uncertainty on the fraction of consumers being impatient, pi,
nor on the return of the portfolio of long assets, R.
A bank that aims at maximizing consumers’ expected utility thus needs to
maximize (1.2) subject to the feasibility constraint, and because the type of
consumers is private information, the constrained efficient program contains
two additional restrictions. The allocation of consumption must be such that
no consumer has an incentive to misreport his type in the interim period:
u(c1(1)) ≥ u(c1(0)), (1.7)
u(c1(0) + c2(0)) ≥ u(c1(1) + c2(1)). (1.8)
Constraint (1.7) ensures that a impatient consumer has no incentive to misre-
port, while (1.8) ensures that a patient consumer does not want to misreport.
Adding constraints (1.7) and (1.8) to the first-best problem, however, does not
change the solution because the constraints are not binding in the first-best.
This implies that the first-best is in fact implementable given the friction of
unobservable types. The second-best thus coincides with the first-best.
The proposed mechanism, a bank representing a contestable banking sector,
proceeds as follows (see also Figure 1.1): In t = 0, the endowment of all
consumers is collected. In exchange the bank offers a demand-deposit contract
that allows a consumer to withdraw c∗1 units in t = 1 and c∗2 units in t = 2.
The bank chooses cDD1 and cDD2 such that u′(cDD1 ) = Ru′(cDD2 ) which is the
FOC for the first-best allocation, see Equation (1.5). R > 1 and concavity of
u imply that cDD1 ≤ cDD2 , and thus Equations (1.7) and (1.8) are satisfied and
it is incentive-compatible for patient consumers to withdraw only in t = 2.
The bank invests e0− I = picDD1 in the storage technology and the remaining
funds I = e0−picDD1 in the long asset, which implies that Equation (1.6) holds.
The representative bank is thus able to implement the first-best allocation.9
The second important result is that there is also a second type of equilibrium
in t = 1. If all patient consumers desire withdrawing at once, the bank will
9Note that the optimality of the banking solution relies on a no-trading restriction of
consumers in t = 1; see Jacklin (1987) and more recently Farhi et al. (2009).
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Bank Bank
picDD1
Bank
I = e0 − picDD1 = (1− pi)cDD2 /R
Consumers
e0
Consumers
picDD1
Consumers
(1− pi)cDD2
Figure 1.1: Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The graph illustrates investment and the
flow of goods (solid arrows). Initially, consumers deposit their endowment at the
bank. Banks invest the endowment in the long and in the short asset. In periods one
and two, early and late consumers are served with the returns of the short and the
long asset, respectively.
be left with assets of picDD1 + `(1− picDD1 ) < 1 which is typically strictly less
than its total liabilities in t = 1, which amount to cDD1 .10 The bank will
therefore be insolvent in t = 1 and no funds for patient consumers will be left
over in t = 2. It is thus optimal for all patient consumers to withdraw and a
bank run may constitute an equilibrium in the interim period. In fact, there
are two subgame-perfect Nash-Equilibria in t = 0, one in which the bank is
established, and a second one in which consumers refuse to deposit funds in
the banks as they expect a bank run in t = 1.
Finally, the third result of the D&D model is that the adverse run equi-
librium can be eliminated by two policy measures: either the banks should
commit to suspending convertibility after paying out an overall amount of
picDD1 , or the government should provide a deposit insurance which guaran-
tees cDD1 units for each consumer in t = 1, irrespective of the banks being
solvent or not. In both cases, the adverse equilibrium can be eliminated at
10The run equilibrium exists whenever cDD1 ≥ 1. This condition is typically satisfied
through the assumption that the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is larger than one,
i.e., −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for every c.
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no cost.11
1.3 Intermediation with Outside Liquidity
We now introduce a new type of agents whom we refer to as “investors”.
Investors can provide banks or consumers with liquidity in the interim period
which we refer to as “outside liquidity”. In the following, we analyze how the
optimal allocation is altered by allowing for interim outside liquidity, and how
the new first-best allocation may be implemented by a banking sector.
Assume that there is a continuum of investors with mass α > 1. Investors
have no endowment initially, but with a probability 1/α an investor j has
an endowment of e1,j = e1 in period one. Otherwise, her endowment is zero.
Therefore, the mass of investors that has a positive endowment is equal to
one, and the overall endowment of all investors is e1 =
∫
e1,jdj. We assume
that e1 > piRe0. As we will see, this condition assures that the supply of
outside liquidity is never limited by a binding resource constraint.
The key friction of private outside liquidity is the following: We assume that
it is the investor’s private information whether she has a positive endowment
in period one. Thus, investors cannot write enforceable contracts in t = 0,
which are contingent on whether they have a positive endowment in t =
1. Because investors cannot contract in t = 0, we will only consider their
behavior form period t = 1 onwards. Furthermore, we have to consider only
those investors who have a positive endowment.
We assume that investors have no market power, and that they are indif-
ferent between consuming in periods one and two. Their utility is given by
v(cˆ1+ cˆ2), where cˆt is her consumption in period t and v : R+ → R is a strictly
increasing function. Consequently, they are willing to invest their complete
endowment e1 as long as the gross return in t = 2 is at least e1.
1.3.1 First-Best with Outside Liquidity
We now derive the new first-best allocation, given that outside liquidity is
available in the interim period. The social planner’s objective function, speci-
fied by the maximization problem (1.2), remains unchanged. The objective is
maximizing the consumers’ welfare, whereas investors’ utility does not enter
11Observe that for suspension of convertibility to be an effective measure there must not
be aggregate uncertainty about the actual fraction of consumers who withdraw early.
Moreover, suspension of convertibility is also ineffective if withdrawing depositors are
paid out by new depositors, see the extension of the D&D setup to an overlapping
generation setting by Qi (1994).
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our welfare measure. However, we assume that even the social planner cannot
transfer funds from investors to consumers without restrictions. Because in-
vestors’ welfare does not directly enter into the objective function, we require
that investors must be willing to participate.12 The aggregate transfer from
investors to consumers in period one is denoted by d1 ≤ e1, and d2 denotes
the reverse transfer in period two. Investors’ participation constraint is given
by d2 ≥ d1. It is straightforward that this constraint will be binding in the
optimum, i.e., d1 = d2 will hold in the following.
The first-best program with outside liquidity is slightly different from the
one in the previous section. We now explicitly consider the budget constraints
in each period. The variable I ∈ [0, e0] again denotes the investment in the
long asset, and an amount e0 − I is invested in storage. Let d denote the
amount of interim liquidity (i.e., the amount of liquidity that is transferred
between investors and consumers), where d = d1 = d2 ≤ e1.
The budget constraints for the two periods are given by
e0 − I + d ≥ pic1(1) + (1− pi)c1(0), (1.9)
RI ≥ pic2(1) + (1− pi)c2(0) + d. (1.10)
Constraint (1.9) ensures that, in t = 1, the payments to consumers do
not exceed the sum of inside liquidity (storage) and interim outside liquidity.
Constraint (1.10) ensures that, in t = 2, the sum of payments to consumers
and the repayment of interim outside liquidity does not exceed the return
from investment in the long asset.
Proposition 1.1 (First-best). In the presence of outside liquidity, the con-
sumers’ first-best consumption allocation is given by c1(1) = c2(0) = Re0, and
c1(0) = c2(1) = 0. It is attained by choosing I = e0 and d = piRe0.
The fundamental insight of Proposition 1.1 is that the D&D allocation,
in which consumption levels in both periods are strictly less than Re0, can
strictly be improved upon.13 The social planner can make full use of the
productive long asset because the supply of liquidity in the interim period
removes the need to invest in storage. In the model with outside liquidity, the
12In our setup, a comparison of consumers’ and investors’ utility does not appear meaning-
ful. We are neither interested in the allocation of risk, nor in redistribution of wealth
between the two groups of agents. We interpret the investor’s participation constraint
rather as a resource constraint that as a friction. It thus appears adequate to refer to
the optimum as the “first-best”.
13This result is reminiscent of the finding by Qi (1994), who shows that storage may be
redundant in a overlapping-generation version of the D&D model.
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trade-off between liquidity insurance (provided through the short-asset, i.e.,
inside liquidity) and return (long-asset) can be solved such that consumption
is perfectly smoothed by making full use of the productive technology.
Observe that the first-best allocation is not unique if the endowment of
investors strictly exceeds the amount that is given to impatient consumers
in the interim period, e1 > piRe0. Because early and late consumption are
perfect substitutes for patient consumers, impatient consumers could receive
some positive payment in t = 1, as long as their total amount of consumption
remains unchanged. Without loss of generality, we focus on the solution
presented in Proposition 1.1 in the following, i.e., impatient consumers only
consume late.14
1.3.2 Efficient Banking
We now show that the first-best allocation in the model with outside liquidity
can be implemented by an institution that is reminiscent of a financial inter-
mediary that signs demand-deposit contracts with consumers in period zero.
In contrast to the situation without outside liquidity, a bank now only invests
in the long asset and raises liquid funds in the interim period. It raises funds
by issuing claims and selling them to investors. We will refer to those claims
as debt.15
As in the D&D setup, one may think of the banking sector as a contestable
market. The assumption of free entry and the resulting perfect competition
imply that financial intermediaries implies contracts that maximize the ex-
pected utility of consumers.16 Again, the law of large numbers is assumed
to apply on the bank level, resulting in a gross return of R on the long asset
with certainty, and a fraction of early impatient consumers of exactly pi.
Therefore, banks can implement the first-best in the following way (see also
Figure 1.2): banks collect the total endowment e0 of all consumers as deposits
in period zero against the promise that consumers can withdraw Re0 units at
any time. In order to serve their obligations, banks invest all of the economy’s
t = 0 endowment in the long assets, transforming them in Re0 units in t = 2.
In the interim period, banks sell claims d on their portfolio of long assets to
investors. Because banks are assumed to be able to diversify the liquidity
14Notice that this allocation can be attained by choosing any d ∈ [piRe0, e1].
15Notice that the bank could likewise issue equity claims. As we frame the problem as
one of rollover, however, we refer to the claims as debt claims without giving a specific
microeconomic reasoning why debt is preferred over equity.
16Alternatively, one may assume that the banking sector is a mechanism or a coalition of
consumers that maximizes the consumers’ expected utility.
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and the return risk, there is no adverse selection in the market for claims in
the interim period. Therefore, the investors’ participation constraint implies
that banks can sell their claims at par. Banks will sell claims with a total
value of piRe0, and only impatient consumers withdraw early. The issuance
of claims is equivalent to a rollover of debt, as the liability towards depositors
is replaced by liabilities towards investors.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Bank Bank Bank
e0
Consumers
e0
Consumers
piRe0
Consumers
(1− pi)Re0
Investors
piRe0d
Investors
d piRe0
Figure 1.2: Private Outside Liquidity. The graph illustrates investment and the flow
of goods (solid arrows) and claims (dashed arrows). Claims associated with demand-
deposit contracts are not depicted. In t = 0, consumers deposit their endowment e0
at the banks. Banks invest the endowment in the long asset, transforming e0 units
of the good into Re0 units. In the interim period, early consumers are served by
selling claims d to investors. In t = 2, banks redeem the claims of investors and
repay investors and late consumers using the returns of the long asset.
Proposition 1.2 (Implementation of the first-best). The first-best allocation
c1(1) = c2(0) = Re0 can be implemented in a demand deposit economy. Banks
invest only in the long asset. Banks serve withdrawing consumers in the in-
terim period by issuing claims on future returns and selling these to investors
in exchange for outside liquidity.
The implementation of the first-best allocation thus involves privately pro-
duced assets. Instead of investing in storage in t = 0, financial intermediaries
issue claims on their future returns in the interim period. The proceeds from
selling these to investors are used to serve withdrawing consumers. This al-
lows intermediaries to increase the investment in the long asset and thus to
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promise higher payments to consumers.
As in the D&D setup, the first-best allocation cannot be implemented by
trade in a financial market in the interim period. The reason is somewhat
different, however. In our model, the main reason why financial markets
cannot implement the first-best is that consumers cannot insure themselves
against idiosyncratic return risk. For such an insurance, contingent contracts
between consumers or between consumers and investors are required, which
are not feasible because of the unobservability of consumers’ returns, liquidity
needs and investors’ endowments. For a detailed analysis, see the Appendix
1.A. Because the idiosyncratic return risk restricts the benefits of side-trading,
it can be interpreted as trading restriction in the sense of (Jacklin, 1987; von
Thadden, 1998).
The fragility associated with this implementation will be discussed in the
next section.
1.4 Private Outside Liquidity and Rollover
Risk
In this section, we show that a bank may face a rollover freeze if it relies on
raising liquidity by issuing claims in the interim period. It turns out that the
efficient private provision of liquidity is inherently fragile. Therefore, banks
might refrain from relying on outside liquidity. Instead, they might rely on
the inefficient storage technology and offer the D&D contract.
1.4.1 Rollover Freeze
Consider the subgame starting in the interim period, given that banks have
invested the complete endowment in the long asset. In this subgame, con-
sumers are endowed with a demand-deposit contract promising Re0 units in
either period, and banks issue claims on their future returns in order to serve
withdrawing consumers. Consumers have the choice to withdraw early or to
wait, and investors have the choice whether to buy claims on bank assets. In
the previous section, we saw that there exists an efficient equilibrium of this
subgame in which consumers do not run on banks and investors roll over the
banks’ debt. However, there are strategic complementarities between agents,
giving rise to multiple equilibria. As in the D&D model, there is a strategic
complementarity between consumers whether or not to withdraw early. In the
model with outside liquidity, an additional strategic complementarity arises
between investors concerning their decision whether to buy claims on bank as-
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sets and thus to roll over the banks’ debt. Furthermore, there is also strategic
complementarity across these two groups of agents. In the following, however,
we will only focus on the strategic complementarity between investors.
In order to understand the rollover freeze, consider a situation in which
no investor is willing to purchase bank claims. Let us first assume that only
impatient consumers withdraw early. In this case, banks will need to liquidate
a positive fraction z = min[pi/`, 1] of their long assets at the inefficient rate
`R in order to serve impatient consumers with an amount of piRe0 units. This
liquidation implies that the bank will only be left with (1 − z)Re0 in t = 2.
Therefore, the bank will not have sufficient funds at hand in order to serve its
patient customers or any investors in t = 2. Therefore, an individual investor
will not provide any liquidity in t = 1, as banks will be insolvent in t = 2.
This implies that even if consumers behave diligently and do not run on the
bank, a rollover freeze always constitutes an equilibrium.
This consideration also leads to the insight that the standard measures to
prevent inefficient liquidation and thus financial crises, such as deposit in-
surance (DI) or suspension of convertibility (SoC), become ineffective. The
reason is that these policies are only targeted at breaking the strategic com-
plementarity between depositors – they are concerned with the demand for
liquidity, but not with its supply. The DI may keep patient consumers from
running on banks, but a bank run is not the only way a bank can become
illiquid and insolvent once a bank relies on outside liquidity. Banks may in
fact experience a rollover freeze as the deposit insurance does not alter the
strategic complementarity between investors. Moreover, SoC is also ineffec-
tive. By suspending convertibility, banks can limit the amount they pay out
to early consumers, which induces stability in the D&D model because it elim-
inates the need for liquidation. However, if banks rely on outside liquidity,
this measure does not prevent liquidation in case of a rollover freeze, inducing
consumers to run.
Lemma 1.1. In the t = 1 subgame, a rollover freeze by investors constitutes
a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, a rollover freeze may occur independently of
whether there is a bank run or not, and irrespectively of the existence of a
credible deposit insurance or of banks committing to suspend convertibility.
In the following, we show that the fact that there may be a rollover freeze in
t = 1 makes banks either refrain from providing the efficient level of liquidity
or it will expose the economy to the rollover risk. In the latter case, the
economy will be fragile despite DI or SoC.
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1.4.2 Inefficient Liquidity Provision
Because the subgame of the interim period has an efficient as well as an ad-
verse equilibrium, the whole game (starting in period zero) has at least one
additional, inefficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. While there might
be a continuum of equilibria, we are interested in the generic case where
investors coordinate on a rollover freeze. In a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium, consumers and banks anticipate not being able to raise any outside
liquidity in the interim period. Given that outside liquidity is not available
in the interim period, banks have to rely on storage again. The constraint
efficient allocation is given by the Diamond-Dybvig allocation described in
Section 1.2.2.
Proposition 1.3. The model has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which
investors do not roll over bank debt, consumers do not run on banks, and banks
implement the Diamond-Dybvig consumption allocation, given by c1(1) = cDD1
and c2(0) = cDD2 , and c1(0) = c2(1) = 0.
We have seen that if banks rely on raising outside liquidity by issuing claims
on their future return, they are exposed to the risk of investors coordinating
on a rollover freeze. The most efficient allocation entails full exposure to the
rollover risk resulting from the coordination problem. If banks fear a rollover
freeze, they might completely shy away from relying on outside liquidity,
rather implementing the less efficient D&D allocation.
The reasoning in Proposition 1.3 is in fact very similar to the argument in
the D&D model that if a bank run was expected in t = 1, consumers would
not be willing to deposit their endowment in the bank in t = 0. However,
it is important to notice that the adverse equilibrium cannot be eliminated
by the standard measures (DI or SoC) in our model. This is due to the key
friction of non-contractible private outside liquidity. One may assume that the
government offers a credible DI or banks may commit to SoC. In our setup,
this will not eliminate the fragility associated with the efficient provision of
liquidity. In fact, if there is no credible DI, a third equilibrium may exist in
which investors would not roll over bank debt and investors would run on the
bank, which is why no bank is founded in the first place. In turn, if there is a
credible DI, this equilibrium does not exist. However, the DI is tested in the
equilibrium of Proposition 1.3 and may be costly for the institution providing
it.
Finally, Proposition 1.3 can be seen as an argument for why liquidity pro-
vision by banks may be limited in general. We argue hat efficient liquidity
provision rests on reliance on outside liquidity. However, privately produced
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assets may not be able to ensure the provision of outside liquidity. Due to
the rollover risk associated with privately produced assets, financial interme-
diaries may thus not be able to implement the optimal allocation. This line
of argument stands in contrast to models arguing that banks are especially
suited to provide banking services because of their fragile capital structure
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). In our setup, the
fragility in the interim period can cause banks to refrain from supplying liq-
uidity in an optimal fashion.
1.4.3 Fragility
Until this point, we have tied our hands by assuming that investors cannot
coordinate their behavior on something that is not observed or not initially
contractible. Formally, this means that investors cannot play a strategy by
which they condition their action on a public signal that is only revealed in
the interim period. This implies that a rollover freeze will never occur in
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Either banks suc-
cessfully rely on outside liquidity because they know that a rollover will be
successful, or they anticipate a rollover freeze and rely on the storage tech-
nology. In equilibrium, the rollover “risk” is degenerate, as it either occurs
with a probability of zero, or it occurs with a probability of one, but has no
effect.17
We now want to consider a setup where investors can coordinate on a
rollover freeze. The notion of coordination problems in the tradition of the
D&D model is that depositors decide in the interim period whether to with-
draw, thus coordinating on whether to run on the bank only after the invest-
ment decision has been made. Formally, the concept of subgame perfection
requires agents to choose a strategy in period zero. Therefore, uncertainty
about the action in t = 1 can only prevail if there exists a public signal upon
which agents can condition their action. A popular illustration of such a
coordination device is the concept of sunspots.18
We adopt this notion and assume that with some exogenous probability
p ∈ (0, 1) a sunspot occurs, and investors play a strategy that prescribes not
17There exists no equilibrium in which investors play mixed strategies and banks rely on
rollover. While this might seem strange, it is worth mentioning that investors play
a weakly dominated strategy in the “rollover equilibrium”. As soon as we introduce
marginal net profits for investors, rollover stops being weakly dominated and an equi-
librium in mixed strategies arises.
18See Cooper and Ross (1998) for an analysis of the D&D setup with sunspots.
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to roll over the banks’ liabilities in case of this sunspot.19 We restrict our
attention to the two extremes where the probability of a rollover freeze is
either close to one or close to zero.
Proposition 1.4. As the probability of a rollover freeze converges to one,
i.e., p → 1, the optimal investment converges towards the Diamond-Dybvig
case, I(p) → IDD. Furthermore, there exists a threshold p` ∈ (0, 1) such
that for p ≤ p`, it is optimal fully to rely on private outside liquidity storage,
I∗(p) = e0.
For the proof of Proposition 1.4, see the Appendix. The result, however, is
very intuitive as it rests on the insight of the following trade-off: On the one
hand, efficiency can be attained by choosing high investment in the illiquid
but profitable long-term technology. Because banks thereby rely on outside
liquidity, this is associated with a high rollover risk. On the other hand,
stability can be attained if banks are not exposed to rollover risk. To this end,
banks make use of the storage technology and thus rely on inside liquidity. In
other words, the trade-off is between strong maturity mismatch and narrow
banking.
If the sunspot probability p is sufficiently high, banks will implement the
D&D allocation. Banks and consumers know that each unit of early con-
sumption that is not covered by investment in the storage technology has to
be raised by liquidating long assets in case of a rollover freeze. Therefore,
banks will finance every unit of early consumption by using inside liquid-
ity and the optimal allocation under this constraint is the D&D allocation.
In contrast, if the probability of a rollover freeze is sufficiently small, banks
choose full exposure to rollover risk by only investing in the long asset, and
implement a consumption level of Re0 for both consumer types. This im-
plies that banks have to engage in substantial liquidation in case of a rollover
freeze, but given that this risk is very low, they are willing to accept this risk.
It is worth noticing that even if a rollover freeze occurs with a positive
probability, it may still be optimal that banks fully rely on outside liquidity.
In this case, the economy is inherently fragile and a financial crisis may unfold
in equilibrium if investors coordinate on a rollover freeze.
19We do not model the underlying reason for the occurrence of these sunspots, and if we
did, their occurrence would probably depend upon the banks’ behavior.
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1.5 Public Outside Liquidity
In Section 1.3, we showed that optimal liquidity management does not rely on
inside liquidity, but rather on outside liquidity. Building on this, Section 1.4
revealed that the efficient allocation can be implemented by banks issuing
private claims and relying on the rollover of debt. However, outside liquidity in
exchange for privately produced assets is associated with a rollover risk. The
anticipation of a rollover freeze can lead to inefficient investment choices ex-
ante. We now analyze how this friction could be overcome. In particular, we
ask whether the government can mitigate the problem by providing liquidity.
In general, a government has the ability – unlike private agents – to commit
future income via taxation or money creation. This makes claims against a
public authority inherently safer than claims produced by the private sector.
In the first part of this section, we therefore assume that the government never
defaults. In this case, we show that the government can increase welfare by
issuing a public claim that can be used by banks to manage liquidity. In
the second part of this section, we relax the assumption that the government
cannot default and show that the benefits from public provision of liquidity
may vanish.
1.5.1 Liquidity Management and Government Bonds
Let us assume that the government never defaults. Consider the following
mechanism in which the government provides liquidity by issuing a govern-
ment bond (Figure 1.3): In t = 0, consumers deposit their endowment e0 at
a bank in exchange for a demand-deposit contract allowing the consumer to
withdraw Re0 in either period. Banks receive government bonds that promise
a payment of b units by the government in t = 2. In exchange for the b gov-
ernment bonds, banks write a debt contract with the government, promising
to pay d units to the government in t = 2. Banks and government will lend
and borrow such that d = b ≥ piRe0. Effectively, banks are expanding their
balance sheets by an amount of b.
In t = 1, banks sell piRe0 units of government bonds to the investors and use
the resulting liquidity to serve withdrawing consumers. In t = 2, the govern-
ment has due gross liabilities of b units, necessary to redeem the government
bonds. An amount of piRe0 is paid to investors. The difference of b − piRe0
units is a gross liability towards banks, resulting from the government bonds
they did not sell to investors in t = 1. However, the banks also owe d = b
units to the government. Therefore, they have a net liability of piRe0 units
towards the government. The banks have an overall return of Re0 from the
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long assets which is used to pay out (1−pi)Re0 units to the patient consumers
and piRe0 to the government.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Government Government
Bank
db
Bank Bank
e0
piRe0d
Consumers
e0
Consumers
piRe0
Consumers
(1–pi)Re0
Investors
piRe0b
Investors
piRe0b
Figure 1.3: Public Outside Liquidity. The graph illustrates investment and the flow
of goods and claims. In this graph, we assume that b = d = pie0R. The dotted arrow
denotes the investment in assets and thus the “transfer” of goods between periods.
The solid arrows denote the flow of goods. The dashed arrows denote the flow of net
claims. For simplicity, the claims of consumers towards banks (resulting from the
demand-deposit contracts) are left out.
Proposition 1.5. If the government provides government bonds in t = 0,
the banks are able to implement the first-best consumption allocation, given
by c1(1) = c2(0) = Re0 and c1(0) = c2(1) = 0. Furthermore, the rollover risk
is eliminated and the economy has a unique equilibrium.
By expanding their balance sheet, the banks implement the first-best al-
location while the rollover risk is completely eliminated. Even if all other
investors refused to buy government bonds, this would not influence the in-
centives of an individual investor. Public outside liquidity eliminates the
coordination problem concerning the supply of liquidity by investors. Note
though that public liquidity provision as described does not address the coor-
dination problem between consumers concerning their withdrawal decisions.
However, given that there is public outside liquidity, a bank run equilibrium
can be eliminated by the standard measures, i.e., by introducing a deposit
insurance or allowing banks to suspend convertibility. This is important as
we saw in the previous section that these measures are ineffective as long as
25
Chapter 1 Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and Government Bonds
the rollover problem is not addressed, but in this context they are effective at
eliminating the coordination problem.
The central reason for the stability is that by assumption the government’s
solvency, unlike that of a bank, does not depend on the behavior of investors.
This eliminates any strategic considerations of investors when deciding to
purchase government bonds in the interim period. Therefore, multiplicity of
equilibria vanishes once government securities are used for liquidity manage-
ment.20
Observe that there are alternative implementations of the first-best alloca-
tion to the one shown in Figure 1.3. There are two obvious alternatives. First,
the government could insure all current and future bank liabilities ex-ante.
Second, the government could provide liquidity itself in the interim period.
Both mechanisms are equivalent in terms of the results in our setup, as they
also eliminate the fragility and thereby enhance efficiency. However, we ar-
gue that both alternatives may not be equally desirable as they may be more
problematic in a richer setup in which other issues such as agency problems
may arise. Insuring bank liabilities may give rise to certain risks on behalf
of the bank (e.g., risk-shifting) and creditors (e.g., weak disciplining effects).
Moreover, if the government actively manages liquidity by lending directly
to banks when they need funds, i.e., in a crisis, this may lead to excessive
maturity mismatch as in, e.g., Farhi and Tirole (2012). We discuss these two
issues in more depth in Section 6.
1.5.2 Government Solvency
So far, we have made the extreme assumption that the government is always
able to repay its debt, irrespectively of what investors do and of whether there
is a banking crisis. This assumption gives government bonds the important
characteristic of being immune against rollover risk. We now relax this as-
sumption in two different ways. First, we allow the government to default with
some exogenous probability. We show that, in this case, public liquidity pro-
vision may still be optimal. Second, we assume that the government’s ability
to repay debt is endogenous and depends on the performance of the banking
sector. In this case, the benefits from public liquidity provision vanish.
Assume first the government defaults with some positive probability which
is given exogenously. This is not necessarily detrimental to efficiency and
stability. Under the condition that investors are risk-neutral, and that the
20This is reminiscent of how multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated in the Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) model when government bonds are introduced (see p. 515 in Tirole,
2010).
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government’s solvency is only revealed after t = 1, the optimal allocation
could still be implemented. Under these conditions, the value of government
bonds is still independent of the behavior of the investors. Thus, even if
there is an exogenous default probability, there is no risk of a coordination
failure between investors. Government bonds would be traded at the fair price
(under par), and the government debt must be chosen such that its expected
repayment equals the banks’ liabilities towards the government. If we require
the debt contracts between the banks and the government to be budget-
balanced in expectation, the implementation could be as follows: Assume that
the government defaults with probability ρ and repays nothing in this case.
The government still holds a claim of d = piRe0 against the banks, whereas
the banks hold claims with a face value of b = d/ρ = piRe0/ρ against banks.
When selling these claims to investors, the fair value is given by d = piRe0.
Let us now relax the exogeneity assumption and go to the other extreme.
Assume that the government can only repay its debt if banks are solvent and
thus fully serve their liabilities towards the government d. We thus relax
the assumption that the government has access to exogenous funds, e.g., via
taxation. In this setup, all features of the setup without government bonds
reappear. The equilibrium of the t = 1 subgame still exists in which investors
roll over debt, and one equilibrium where they do not. The whole game thus
still has a subgame-perfect equilibrium that implements the first-best. How-
ever, this equilibrium is not unique – there also exists an equilibrium of the
t = 1 subgame where a rollover freeze is accompanied by a government de-
fault. This induces banks to refrain from implementing the optimal allocation
and the D&D allocation is implemented instead. In this case, the public pro-
vision of liquidity cannot help to overcome the coordination problem. The
fragility of an economy in which both the solvency of banks and that of the
government are endogenous and interdependent is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has two main results: First, liquidity management with privately
produced assets is either inefficient or associated with rollover risk, which
makes an economy inherently fragile. Second, financial intermediaries can
implement the optimal allocation by using government bonds.
In the absence of public liquidity, financial intermediaries face a trade-off
between high investment, which goes along with high rollover risk (high level
of illiquid, but profitable long-term investments and low level of storage), and
27
Chapter 1 Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and Government Bonds
low investment, which comes with low rollover risk (low levels of profitable
long-term investments and high level of storage). For the case of the 2007-09
financial crisis, our model suggests that intermediaries chose high investment
levels that created a strong maturity mismatch. In the run-up to the crisis,
financial intermediaries transformed long-term real investments into short-
term securities, thereby aiming at making them liquid. E.g., illiquid assets
like ABS and MBS (which are securitized long-term real investments) were
transformed into short-term securities such as ABCP. In the crisis, however,
these short-term securities stopped being liquid and adverse consequences of
the large-scale maturity mismatch realized.
Importantly, the rollover risk in our model is different from the traditional
bank run problem in the style of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In D&D,
the bank run problem can be addressed by contracting in the initial period,
e.g., by implementing a deposit insurance or allowing for a suspension of
convertibility. In contrast, the rollover risk in our model cannot be eliminated
in such a way because this would require contracting with a party that is not
available initially. The problem originates from the friction that investors
cannot commit initially to provide liquidity later. Their endowment does not
realize before the time at which financial intermediaries need liquid funds.
This makes liquidity management with privately produced assets inherently
fragile.
In the second part, we demonstrate how liquidity management with govern-
ment securities can improve the efficiency and stability of an economy. The
government has the unique ability to commit future resources via taxation.
Therefore, government securities are – in comparison to privately produced
assets – less prone to coordination failures, i.e., less exposed to rollover risk.
This property makes public outside liquidity superior to private outside liq-
uidity.
This chapter thereby also contributes to the following basic but yet unre-
solved question: How should a public authority deal with liquidity provision?
The traditional view since Bagehot (1873) is that a government should lend to
illiquid but solvent institutions at high rates, while refusing to lend to insol-
vent institutions. The implementation of this principle might not be straight
forward. That is, it may generally be problematic to identify whether an in-
stitution is illiquid or insolvent (see, e.g., Rochet and Vives, 2004). Moreover,
Farhi and Tirole (2012) point out that if a government commits to intervening
in case of liquidity needs, a collective moral hazard may give rise to an overall
excessive maturity mismatch in an economy.
This chapter discusses a different approach to this problem. We find that
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the government should ensure efficient liquidity management by issuing gov-
ernment securities that should be held by financial intermediaries. This is a
simple way of circumventing the undesired consequences that may arise when
the regulator insures bank liabilities or provides emergency liquidity in case
of a financial crisis. In our model, financial intermediaries are in fact always
willing to hold government bonds to manage liquidity. However, in a richer
model, banks may prefer to hold privately produced assets if these assets
promise a higher return than government securities. In this case, a regulator
might optimally force banks to hold government securities in order to enhance
stable liquidity provision.
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Appendix 1.A Sub-Optimality of Financial
Markets under Outside
Liquidity
Let us analyze the competitive equilibrium of an economy where consumers
hold assets directly and trade on financial markets. In the D&D model, the
first-best cannot be achieved via financial markets because, in equilibrium, the
competitive market prices give consumers investment incentives that do not
induce the investment profile that optimally trades off early liquidity needs
and the returns of the long asset. This inefficiency arises because consumers
do not take into account the pecuniary externalities of their investment. This
is induced by the friction of unobservable liquidity needs (unobservable types).
In our setup, pecuniary externality do not necessarily arise. The mere
unobservability of the liquidity type itself does not impede the implementation
of the first-best. In the absence of return risk, each consumer could privately
invest his whole endowment in the long asset and sell claims on the asset in
the interim period. The key frictions in our case are that, on the one hand,
the return risk cannot be diversified on the individual level and, on the other
hand, the unobservability of the risky return induces adverse selection, leading
to inefficient liquidation. The liquidity type friction only intensifies the return
risk friction.
The first-best can only be implemented if all resources are initially invested
in the long asset. Furthermore, consumers must be perfectly insured against
return risk. However, this insurance is only implementable with commitment
in period zero. In a pure financial market economy with spot markets for
claims on future returns, contingent contracts are not feasible. Therefore, the
financial markets cannot implement an allocation that is efficient ex-ante. The
non-diversifiable idiosyncratic return risk might also imply that consumers
invest a positive fraction of their endowment in storage.
Moreover, the financial-market allocation might not even be efficient ex
post, i.e., given the initial private investment. If all consumers in fact invest
in the long asset privately, all impatient consumers have to either sell or
liquidate their asset in the interim period. Since the return is unobservable,
all assets have to be sold at the same price R∗. All impatient consumers with
a return Ri > R∗/` have an incentive to liquidate instead of selling claims,
reducing the average quality in the market. The liquidation of projects is a
form of adverse selection and constitutes an inefficiency ex post. Moreover,
patient consumers with a return Ri < R∗ have an incentive to sell at price R∗
instead of waiting, thus exacerbating the adverse selection and inefficiency.
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
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Figure 1.4: Financial Market. The graph illustrates investment and trade under the
assumption that full investment in the long asset is chosen. In the interim period,
the graph denotes the flow of goods and claims for a consumer who chooses to sell
claims on the market. Notice that there are also agents who liquidate their assets or
hold on to them until t = 2 and thus do not interact with investors.
Appendix 1.B Sunspots: Optimal
Contracts under Private
Outside Liquidity
Assume that there is a public signal in t = 1 which we might call sunspot,
following a Bernoulli distribution with success probability p. Assume further
that investors play a pure strategy by which they base their rollover decision
on this public signal. With probability p, all investors refrain from rolling
over, and with probability 1− p, all investors engage in rollover. We are now
looking for the optimal consumption profiles of consumers, i.e., the optimal
investment behavior of banks, and abstract from bank runs. The optimal con-
tract between banks and consumers will be state-contingent, i.e., contingent
on the sunspot, or equivalently, on the behavior of investors.
Define the investment threshold I` such that
`u′
(
e0 − I`
pi
)
= u′
(
RI`
1− pi
)
. (1.11)
This threshold has the following interpretation: It is ex-post optimal to liq-
uidate a positive fraction in case of a rollover freeze if and only if investment
exceeds this threshold, I > I`. Because ` < 1/R, it holds that I` ∈ (IDD, e0),
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i.e., liquidation is not efficient ex post in a setup without outside liquidity
(D&D), but it is efficient if banks do not invest in storage and completely rely
on rollover, but this investors coordinate on a rollover freeze.
For the contingency of rollover, the optimal contract includes perfect con-
sumption smoothing through outside liquidity and no liquidation, c1 = c2 =
e0− I +RI. For the contingency of a rollover freeze, there is positive liquida-
tion if I > I`, and there is no liquidation if I ≤ I`. The optimal investment
level I is determined by the probability of the rollover freeze.
We first derive the optimal consumption allocation in case of a rollover
freeze for a given investment level I. The optimization problem is given by
max
c1,c2,z∈[0,1]
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2), (1.12)
s.t. pic1 ≤ e0 − I + z`RI, and (1.13)
pic1 + (1− pi)c2 ≤ e0 − I + z`RI + (1− z)RI. (1.14)
The aggregate budget constraint (1.14) is always binding. There exists a
threshold I0 < IDD such that for I < I0 it holds that z = 0 and the bud-
get constraint for period one is not binding, leading to perfect consumption
smoothing. For I0 ≤ I ≤ I` it holds that z = 0, and the first period bud-
get constraint is binding, implying that c2 > c1. For I > I` it holds that
z(I) ∈ (0, 1) such that
`u′
(
e0 − I + z`RI
pi
)
= u′
((1− z)RI
1− pi
)
. (1.15)
We now have (implicitly) specified the optimal contingent consumption pro-
files given an investment level I. We now maximize over this investment level.
We split the problem by looking at the maximizing level of investment within
each of the two intervals [I0, I`] and (I`, e0]. We can ignore the interval [0, I0)
because it is dominated by I0.
There exist two thresholds p0 and p`, 0 < p0 < p` < 1, such that I(p) = e0
iff p ≤ p0, and I∗(p`) = I`.
If p ∈ (p0, p`), the optimal I∗(p) ∈ (I`, e0), and I∗ and z are determined by
0 = p
[
(z`R− 1)u′
(
e0 − I∗ + z`RI
pi
)
+ (1− z)Ru′
((1− z)RI∗
1− pi
)]
+ (1− p)(R− 1)u′(e0 + (R− 1)I∗), and (1.16)
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`u′
(
e0 − I + z`RI
pi
)
= u′
((1− z)RI
1− pi
)
. (1.17)
If p > p`, the optimal I∗(p) ∈ [IDD, I`) and its level is determined by
p
[
−u′
(
e0 − I∗
pi
)
+Ru′
(
RI∗
1− pi
)]
+(1−p)(R−1)u′(1+(R−1)I∗) = 0. (1.18)
For any p ∈ (p`, 1), it holds that I∗(p) ∈ (IDD, I`). As p → 1, it holds that
I∗(p)→ IDD.
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Sovereign Defaults, Bank Runs,
and Contagion
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide a model that unifies the notion of self-fulfilling
banking crises and sovereign debt crises. We show how these crises can be
contagious, i.e., how a bank run can trigger a sovereign default, and vice versa
(first type of contagion). We discuss under which conditions a government
is unable to eliminate self-fulfilling banking crises by implementing a deposit
insurance scheme. Moreover, we illustrate how crises can be contagious across
countries (second type of contagion), and how contagious crises can be pre-
vented. This allows us to evaluate the efficacy of recent policy proposals
for the implementation of banking union in the euro area. We show under
which conditions a supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme can eliminate
self-fulfilling crises at not cost.
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area which has accompanied and fol-
lowed the recent financial crisis since early 2009 has made the interdependence
of sovereign and financial stability a prominent topic in the academic and po-
litical debate. Farhi and Tirole (2014) state that danger of the feedback loop
between banking crises and sovereign debt crises is an exceptionally uncontro-
versial economic idea. Several terrifying terms have been invented invented to
describe this phenomenon, like “vicious cycle”, “doom loop”, “diabolic loop”,
or “deadly embrace”.
However, this phenomenon is anything but new. Historically, sovereign de-
faults and banking crises have often preceded and accompanied each other
(see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2011), but most existing data concerns
emerging economies. Furthermore, there have been surprisingly few formal
models that help to guide our theoretical understanding of how sovereign
defaults and banking crises are interrelated, in particular for the case of de-
veloped and highly leveraged economies. Only recent, theoretical models on
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this topic were provided, e.g., by Acharya et al. (2014), Farhi and Tirole
(2014), Leonello (2013), Cooper and Nikolov (2013), and König et al. (2013).
Banking crises and sovereign debt crises have the common feature that
they may result from coordination on a bad equilibrium. In a self-fulfilling
bank run, depositors desire to withdraw all at once. This is an equilibrium
because if all depositors desire to withdraw at once, it forces an otherwise
solvent bank to engage in inefficient liquidation, leading to insolvency (see,
e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). In a self-
fulfilling sovereign debt crisis, investors roll over a sovereign’s debt only at a
high risk premium, or even refuse to do so. This constitutes an equilibrium as
the high sovereign risk premium increases the government’s debt burden and
thereby the likelihood of a default (see, e.g., Calvo, 1988; Cole and Kehoe,
2000).
We present a simple banking model of maturity transformation in the tradi-
tion of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In the first part of this chapter, we con-
sider the case of a closed economy. The model is reduced to a two-period ver-
sion (we do not model the investment stage) and features consumers, banks,
investors, and a government. We make two key assumptions: First, banks
hold government bonds that they can sell in a secondary market in order to
manage the liquidity needs of consumers. Second, the government’s tax base
is correlated with the real economic activity which in turn depends on the
performance of the financial sector. The model features a strategic comple-
mentarity within the consumers’ withdrawal decision, within the investors’
decision to purchase government bonds, as well as across the decisions of the
two types of agents. There exist two types of self-fulfilling equilibria in our
model: The first one is a no-crisis equilibrium, in which government bonds
trade at face value, and the government as well as the banks fulfill their obli-
gations. The second one is a crisis equilibrium. In the crisis equilibrium,
all consumers withdraw early, causing a bank run. Depending on the fiscal
soundness of the government, a bank run can be accompanied by a rollover
freeze and a sovereign default. If the government is fiscally weak, a banking
crisis and a sovereign default aggravate and reinforce each other in a “vicious
circle”. Only if a government is fiscally strong, it can eliminate the crisis
equilibrium by providing a deposit insurance.
In the second part of this chapter, we extend our model to a multiple coun-
try setup where countries are interdependent, and we analyze cross-country
effects of banking crises and sovereign debt crises. We assume that countries
are interdependent due to banks diversifying their government bond holdings.
If countries are sufficiently interdependent, self-fulfilling twin crises are con-
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tagious across borders. We show that if one country is fiscally weak while the
other country is fiscally sound, it may be beneficial for both countries to pool
their funds. The crisis equilibrium and its adverse consequences can be ruled
out ex-ante by the following policy: Both countries form a banking union that
implements a supranational deposit insurance scheme, and potentially also a
fiscal union. By committing to repay the sovereign debt and to provide de-
posit insurance jointly, their joint promise will never be tested in equilibrium
and is thus costless. A crucial insight is that forming such a union is not only
beneficial for the fiscally weak country, but also for the fiscally strong country.
Guided by the insights of the model, we discuss two policy implications.
The first policy implication concerns the design of the European Banking
Union, with a special focus on the deposit insurance. Our model features
cross-border costs of banking crises and sovereign defaults and points out
channels through which a crisis in one country can trigger a crisis in another
country. This in turn allows rationalizing policy responses by countries that
are affected by foreign banking crises or sovereign defaults. The model al-
lows us to give conditions under which a banking union (i.e., a joint deposit
insurance) or the combination of a banking and a fiscal union can prevent
contagious self-fulfilling banking crises and sovereign defaults. The model
hence sheds light on the policy debates following the European debt crisis
and allows us to investigate the efficacy of recent policy proposals (European
Commission, 2013a). These proposals for a banking union focus on the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
A supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) which would take the cur-
rent national deposit insurance to a supranational level seems to be politically
infeasible so far. By considering the self-fulfilling nature of banking crises, we
show to what extend a banking union in its current form is ineffective at pre-
venting such crises. Given that there are differences in the fiscal soundness of
its member states, we argue that a banking union might only be effective if
it comes with a joint deposit insurance.
The second policy implication concerns the regulatory treatment of banks
holding government bonds. While there may be good reasons for banks to use
government bonds as an instrument to manage liquidity needs,1 we show that
this may also be a considerable source of fragility once there is a prospect of a
government default. Fragility arises in our setup whenever the government’s
ability to repay its debt depends on the performance of the financial sec-
tor. This condition may be satisfied in developed economies that have highly
leveraged financial systems. This chapter can therefore also be understood
1See, e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 1998, Gorton and Ordoñez, 2013, and Chapter 1.
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as a contribution to the debate concerning the liquidity regulation of banks.
Regulatory frameworks typically facilitate the holding of government debt by
intermediaries. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initially re-
frained from imposing any capital requirement for government bond holdings
(see, e.g., Goodhart, 2011). Positive risk weights for poorly rated government
bonds have been put on the agenda only recently, and were introduced in
Basel III (Basel Committee, 2011). Our model provides an argument for why
the exposure of banks to sovereign debt is a severe problem that is not ad-
equately dealt with under both the current and the currently planned bank
regulation.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents a model of a
closed economy, derives the equilibria, and discusses the effect of a deposit
insurance. In Section 2.3, the model is extended to a two-country setting
with international integration. We analyze contagion across countries and
discuss optimal crisis prevention policies. Section 2.4 relates our findings to
the current debate about the European Banking Union.
Related Literature
This chapter reaches out to the large literature on self-fulfilling banking crises
(see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein
and Pauzner, 2005) and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises (see, e.g., Calvo,
1988; Alesina et al., 1990; Cole and Kehoe, 2000), and attempts to unify some
aspects of the two strands.
The first part of this chapter is very closely related to a series of recent
papers that model banking crises and sovereign debt crises in unified frame-
works (Cooper and Nikolov, 2013; König et al., 2013; Leonello, 2013). Cooper
and Nikolov also provide a model with multiple equilibria where the adverse
equilibrium is characterized by a vicious cycle in which a government debt
crisis and a banking crisis aggravate and reinforce each other. However, their
focus is on the pricing of government debt, while emphasize the strategic
complementarity of agents. The papers by König et al. and Leonello provide
models featuring unique equilibria – reminiscent of Goldstein’ (2005) twin
crisis model – and they analyze how government guarantees affect financial
stability and the government’s ability to fulfill its obligation. All three pa-
pers have in common that the contagion from a banking crisis to a sovereign
default originates from the increased public liabilities that arise from a safety
net. In contrast, contagion in our setup arises because a financial crisis re-
duces the government’s tax base and thus decreases its funding instead of
increasing its expenditure. The channel from sovereign debt to banking crisis
is similar, however, it results from banks hold government bonds.
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With Acharya et al. (2014), we share the notion that the government’s tax
base is limited by a Laffer-curve property. Unlike our approach, they focus
on the optimal redistribution (bailout) between a financial sector with debt
overhang and a corporate sector. They find that a bailout can lose its bite if
it lowers the value of government bonds that are held by the financial sector.
In the second part of this chapter, we analyze how crises can be contagious
across countries. This part is related to the literature on financial contagion
and the spreading of banking panics (see, e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000; Das-
gupta, 2004). In particular, the second part of this chapter relates to Bolton
and Jeanne (2011) who analyze the cross-border effects of sovereign defaults
in financially integrated areas. In their model, government debt is used as
collateral in interbank markets. Economic integration is beneficial as banks
can diversify their government bond holdings, which fosters welfare-increasing
interbank trade. However, this comes with possible contagion of a sovereign
default ex-post, and fiscally strong countries might suffer from fiscal integra-
tion. This chapter is concerned with maturity transformation by banks and
its inherent fragility, and not with the banks’ role in allocating capital. More-
over, government defaults are endogenous in our setup and directly linked to
the performance of the banking sector. In contrast to the results of Bolton
and Jeanne, we find that fiscally strong countries might actually benefit from
fiscal integration if this prevents self-fulfilling crises.
Farhi and Tirole (2014) consider a model featuring fundamental financial
and fiscal shocks in which banks hold domestic and foreign government bonds.
Banks have an incentive to engage in excessive risk taking, particularly in
collective moral hazard because the national government cannot commit to
refrain from bailouts. This provides a new argument in favor of a bank-
ing union because the government is better off by delegating regulation to a
supranational supervisor who takes a tough ex-post regulatory stance.
2.2 Single-Country Model
2.2.1 Setup
Consider an economy that goes through a sequence of two dates, t ∈ {1, 2}.
The economy is populated by a continuum of consumers of mass one and a
continuum of investors of mass one. Moreover, there is a banking sector and a
government. There exists a single good that can be used for both consumption
and investment, and all units are denoted in terms of this good.
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Consumers
Each consumer i is endowed with a demand deposit contract (c∗1, c∗2) that al-
lows her either to withdraw c∗1 units from her bank account in t = 1 or c∗2 units
in t = 2. Consumers have preferences as proposed by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). There are two types: a fraction pi ∈ [0, 1] of consumers is impatient,
while the remaining fraction (1 − pi) is patient. Impatient consumers only
derive utility from consuming early; their utility is given by u(c1). Patient
consumers are indifferent between consuming early and late; their utility is
given by u(c1 + c2). Types are private information of each consumer. Con-
sumers face the decision to withdraw and to consume in t = 1 or to withdraw
and consume in t = 2. Notice that the attributes “patient / impatient” char-
acterize the consumer’s exogenous types. In contrast, the attributes “late /
early” will characterize the endogenous decision of consumers: an “early con-
sumer” withdraws and consumes in t = 1, while a “late consumer” withdraws
and consumes in t = 2. We denote the decision of each consumer i to with-
draw as well as to consume early with ωi ∈ {0, 1}, where ωi takes the value
one if consumer i withdraws in t = 1. Let ω = ∫ 10 ωidi be the aggregate mass
of early consumers.
Banking Sector
There is a banking sector that has the demand deposit contracts – which are
the assets of consumers – as liabilities. It owns two types of assets: it holds
government bonds as well as an illiquid portfolio of loans, both maturing at
t = 2.
Banks are assumed to hold government bonds for the purpose of liquidity
management. While we are not giving a micro-foundation for why banks are
holding government bonds, we refer to various arguments for why financial
intermediaries use government securities for liquidity management.
Government bonds are valuable as a medium of transfer across time (see,
e.g., Gale, 1990; Woodford, 1990), and private agents may not be able to pro-
vide sufficient pledgable income (Holmström and Tirole, 1998). Furthermore,
government securities – unlike private assets – are not subject to adverse se-
lection (Gorton and Ordoñez, 2013), and government securities are simply less
exposed to rollover risk than privately produced assets (compare Chapter 1).
In our model, banks are not considered to be agents. They behave mechan-
ically in that they serve early-withdrawing consumers by selling government
bonds to investors and by liquidating the illiquid assets if necessary. Having
the demand deposit contracts as liabilities, banks need to serve a mass ω of
consumers with c∗1 units in t = 1 each, and a mass 1 − ω of consumers with
c∗2 units in t = 2. Banks own a stock of government bonds which mature in
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t = 2. Bonds are liquid in the sense that they may be sold to investors in
t = 1. Selling these government bonds allow banks to fulfill their short-term
liability, i.e., to serve early consumers. The total amount of government debt
in the economy is given by B, and banks own a fraction α of them, i.e., they
own αB < B units of government bonds. One unit of the government bond
is a promise of the government to repay one unit of the good in t = 2. Details
of the government bonds will be further specified below.
Moreover, banks also own I units of an illiquid asset to serve their long-term
liabilities. The illiquid asset has an after-tax return of r = (1 − τ)R > 1 in
period two. The asset can be liquidated in t = 1, yielding a return per unit of
` < 1. The fraction of illiquid assets which banks liquidate is denoted by z.
The total return of liquidation is thus given by z`I. As indicated, the illiquid
asset can be interpreted as a loan portfolio which pays off in the long run. In
the short run, it can be liquidated at a substantial discount. The liquidation
value ` can be interpreted as the price in the secondary market for the bank’s
loan portfolios and the discount may result from various frictions we do not
model.2
Government
There is a government that has an outstanding amount of debt B, maturing
in t = 2. Like banks, the government is assumed to behave mechanically.
The government always repays its debt if possible and defaults otherwise. In
t = 2, the government has an overall tax revenue of T (z) = E + τ(1 − z)RI
at its disposal. It consists of an exogenous tax revenue of E ≥ 0, and an
endogenous tax revenue τ(1 − z)RI from taxation of the illiquid technology
of the banking sector, where τ ∈ (0, 1) is fixed. The tax revenue is used for
the repayment of the government’s debt.3
We interpret the exogenous tax revenue E as the tax revenue that the
government generates irrespective of the performance of the banking sector.
In turn, the endogenous tax revenue displays the fiscal revenue that depends
on the performance of the banking sector and thus decreases in the level of
liquidation z. It should thus be interpreted as the taxable economic activity
that is generated through successful intermediation by banks. We assume
that the government cannot raise any taxes in t = 1. This clearly displays an
2The assumption of low liquidation values is standard in the banking literature and may
result from moral hazard (Holmström and Tirole, 1997), limited commitment of future
cash-flows (Hart and Moore, 1994), adverse selection (Flannery, 1996), or uncertainty-
averse investors (Uhlig, 2010).
3The remaining government budget can be used for other purposes. It could be used to
provide a public good, or it could be transferred to the consumers. The exact use of
remaining funds is not relevant in our model.
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extreme simplification. However, we argue that a government’s ability to raise
taxes at any point in time has natural limits,4 and we make the simplifying
assumption that it is zero in the short run.
Importantly, we assume that the government repays its debt whenever
B ≤ T (z). For simplicity we assume that it fully defaults otherwise. With
this assumption, we deviate from large parts of the sovereign risk literature
and completely abstract from willingness to pay considerations.5 However,
we refer to recent contributions arguing that ability-to-pay constraints domi-
nate willingness-to-pay considerations, especially in advanced economies with
a high degree of leverage where defaults may trigger severe financial sector
turmoil (Gennaioli et al., 2014; Acharya and Rajan, 2013). If the govern-
ment cannot default selectively (Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Broner et al.,
2010), its incentives to default are generally very weak whenever the costs of
defaulting are very high for domestic creditors. Thus, a sovereign default in a
leveraged economy is likely to result from a binding ability to pay constraint.
Investors
There is a continuum of investors of mass 1. Each investor j is equipped
with one unit of the good in t = 1. Investors are risk-neutral and do not
discount. Investors buy government bonds from banks whenever their return
is non-negative. Formally, the decision of an outside investor j to purchase
government bonds from banks at face value or not is denoted ηj ∈ {0, 1}. It
takes the value one if she is willing to buy a government bond at a price of
one. Let η = min[αB, ∫ 10 ηjdj] be the aggregate mass of outside investors that
buy government bonds at face value from banks.
In the following, we will refer to the purchase of government bonds by
investors as rollover. Note that, in our setup, it does not matter whether the
government needs to borrow t = 1 in order to repay banks that hold bonds
that mature in t = 1 or whether banks need to sell government bonds that
mature in t = 2 in a secondary market in t = 1. The first scenario clearly
looks like a classical rollover problem. As both scenarios are equivalent, we
use the expression rollover in order to simplify the wording.
4See, e.g., the Laffer-curve property in Acharya et al. (2014).
5The literature on sovereign debt and risk has been shaped by the willingness to pay view,
which argues that governments repay their debt when the costs of repayment are lower
than the penalty expected for default. In the literature, default penalties have been
argued to be, e.g., exclusion from capital markets or trade sanctions (see, e.g., Eaton
and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
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Parameters
In the following, we make some restrictions on the model’s parameters in
order to ensure outcomes and effects in a relevant domain. The first three
assumptions guarantee the existence of a no crises equilibrium (also referred
to as type I equilibrium), while the last assumption ensures the existence of
a crisis equilibrium (type II equilibrium).
Assumption 2.1. c∗2 ≥ c∗1
Assumption 2.1 guarantees that it is incentive-compatible for patient con-
sumers to withdraw late and to consume in t = 2 conditional on banks being
able to pay out their promised payment, i.e., conditional on no liquidation.
Assumption 2.2. pic∗1 = αB ≤ 1 and rI = (1− pi)c∗2
The first equation of Assumption 2.2 ensures that banks can serve all impa-
tient consumers by selling their government bond holdings at face value. The
second equation ensures that all patient consumers can be served by the long-
term return of the loan portfolio if they withdraw late. Moreover, αB ≤ 1
implies that investors have enough funds to purchase all government bonds
from banks at face value.
Assumption 2.3. T (0) = E + τRI ≥ B
Assumption 2.3 ensures that the government’s tax revenue is sufficient to
repay the government’s debt given that there is no liquidation by banks.
Assumption 2.4. (1− pi)c∗1 > `I
Assumption 2.4 implies that the banks will be insolvent and illiquid in
t = 1 in case all consumers withdraw early, irrespective of the government’s
solvency. The reason is that liquidation is sufficiently inefficient for a panic-
based bank run to exist. While the patient consumers’ claims might be met
by selling the government bonds, Assumption 2.4 implies that if all patient
consumers withdraw early, their claims equal to (1 − pi)c∗1 cannot be met
by proceeds of complete liquidation, `I. That is, the banking sector will be
illiquid and insolvent in t = 1 whenever there is complete withdrawal and
liquidation.
2.2.2 Outcomes
In the following section, we show that the economy described above has two
equilibria in pure strategies: a no crisis (type I) equilibrium and a crisis
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(type II) equilibrium. In the no-crisis equilibrium, only impatient consumers
withdraw early and outside investors roll over the government’s debt. In
the crisis equilibrium, all consumers withdraw early, causing a bank run.
Depending on the fiscal soundness of the government, a bank run can be
accompanied by a sovereign default and a rollover freeze.
In order to derive the equilibrium outcomes, we first analyze the banks’
liquidation of the loan portfolio for any given level of aggregate withdrawal and
any rollover decision. We can then calculate the value of the demand deposit
contract, as well as the value of government bonds in t = 2, as functions of
aggregate withdrawal and rollover. This in turn will pin down the optimal
individual withdrawal and rollover decisions in t = 1.
Liquidation
Banks have to fulfill their obligations in t = 1 whenever possible. Recall
that ω denotes the mass of consumers that withdraw early, and η the mass
of investors purchasing government bonds at face value. Banks need liquid
funds of ωc∗1 in t = 1, since they have to pay c∗1 units of the good to a mass
ω of consumers. Banks sell η units of the governments bonds to investors.
Given ω and η, banks must liquidate a fraction z such that their liquid funds
equal the demand for early consumption or engage in complete liquidation,
z = 1, otherwise. Liquidation z is implicitly given by the budget equation
ωc∗1 = η + z`I whenever feasible, or explicitly by
z(ω, η) = min
[
1, [ωc
∗
1 − η]+
`I
]
. (2.1)
If banks can serve all withdrawing consumers by selling government bonds,
liquidation is unnecessary. However, if the proceeds from selling government
bonds are not sufficient to serve all withdrawing consumers, banks will have
to engage in inefficient liquidation of the loan portfolio.
Withdrawal and Rollover
The individual decision of patient consumers to withdraw depends on the
funds that banks have available in t = 2. Similarly, the decision of investors
to purchase government bonds depends on the funds that the government has
available in t = 2. Whenever there is liquidation, the amount left for late
consumers and the tax revenue of the government decrease.
The deposit contract (c∗1, c∗2) is characterized by promised payments. If
there is liquidation, actual repayments (c1, c2) may fall short of the promised
levels. In period one, banks have to serve any withdrawing consumer with c∗1
whenever possible. If banks engage in liquidation, this reduces the level of late
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consumption c2, and if consumers in addition start to run on the banks, this
also reduces c1. For impatient consumers, it is dominant strategy to withdraw
early, implying ω ∈ [pi, 1]. Given liquidation z(η, ω), the payments made to
each patient consumer who is withdrawing late is given by
c2(z(ω, η), ω) = (1− z(ω, η))1− pi1− ωc
∗
2. (2.2)
A patient consumer only withdraws early if c2 < c∗1.6 The optimal with-
drawal decision of a patient consumer is therefore given by
ω∗i (ω, η) =
0 if c2(z(ω, η)) ≥ c
∗
1
1 if c2(z(ω, η)) < c∗1.
(2.3)
We can derive the optimal rollover decision in a similar fashion. Given z(η, ω),
the government has a tax revenue of
T (z(ω, η)) = E + τ(1− z(ω, η))RI. (2.4)
The government repays its debt whenever the tax revenue T (z(η, ω)) ex-
ceeds the government’s outstanding debt B, and defaults otherwise. Investors
purchase government debt at face value if the government will be able to re-
pay its debt, and do not purchase if the government is expected to default.
An investor’s rollover decision is thus given by
η∗i (ω, η) =
1 if B ≤ T (z(ω, η))0 if B > T (z(ω, η)). (2.5)
The interrelation of the model’s key variables is summarized in Figure 2.1.
The left cycle is the well-known cycle that lies at the heart of a self-fulfilling
bank run, as in the classic bank-run model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983):
Increased liquidation lowers the level of funds available for late consumption.
This in turn increases the incentive to withdraw early. High early withdrawal,
however, further increases liquidation.7 The right cycle shows how an antic-
ipated sovereign default can be self-fulfilling: The inability of banks to sell
6We define c2(1, 1) := 0, i.e., the potential late consumption is zero in case of complete
liquidation.
7For the sake of completeness, the dotted arrow represents a positive feedback effect of
early withdrawal on late consumption: more consumers withdrawing early implies that
the remaining available funds are distributed among a smaller mass of late consumers.
This channel represents the same effect through which a bank run is welfare-increasing
in Allen and Gale (1998).
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Figure 2.1: Interdependence of Sovereign Debt and Banking.
government bonds forces them to liquidate some of the loan portfolio. Liqui-
dation reduces the tax base and thus future tax revenue. This in turn may
reduce the amount the government can repay. Consequentially, investors may
become unwilling to purchase government bonds, forcing banks to liquidate
even more.
The two cycles are connected through the liquidation of the illiquid loan
portfolio. This allows a banking crisis to be contagious by triggering a
sovereign debt crisis, and vice versa (1st type of contagion).
Definition 2.1. A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is given by a set of
consumers’ withdrawal decisions {ωi} and outside investors’ rollover decisions
{ηj}, such that these decisions are best responses, i.e., ωi = ω∗i (ω, η) ∀i and
ηj = η∗j (ω, η) ∀j, where ω =
∫ 1
0 ωidi, and η = min[αB,
∫ 1
0 ηjdj].
We are now equipped in order to formulate the first result:
Proposition 2.1. The model has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
a) Type I equilibrium (ω, η) = (pi, αB):
Only impatient consumers withdraw early, banks do not liquidate, the tax
revenue is sufficient to repay creditors, and investors are willing to buy
government bonds.
b) Type II equilibrium
E < B Sovereign default and bank run (ω, η) = (1, 0): All consumers
withdraw early and there is no rollover, inducing full liquidation.
This results in illiquidity and insolvency of both the government and
the banking sector.
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E ≥ B Bank run (ω, η) = (1, αB): Investors roll over government debt,
but all consumers withdraw early. Although there is a bank run and
full liquidation, the government is still able to fully serve its debt.
For the proof of Proposition 2.1, see the Appendix. The multiplicity of
equilibria arises from the strategic complementarity between agents. There
are three different components of strategic complementarity in the model.
First, there is a strategic complementarity between consumers in their deci-
sion to withdraw: the more consumers withdraw, the higher the incentive for
an individual consumer to withdraw as well. Second, there is strategic com-
plementarity between the investors in their decision to purchase government
bonds: more investors purchasing government bonds increases the individual
incentive to purchase government bonds as well. Third, there is strategic
complementarity across the two types of agents: higher levels of withdrawal
decrease the incentive to roll over and vice versa.
Note that in the above setup both types of equilibria always exist. The
type I equilibrium is always characterized by successful debt rollover and the
absence of a panic-based bank run. The type II equilibrium is characterized
by either a twin crisis where a sovereign default and a panic-based bank
run accompany each other, or by a panic-based bank run without sovereign
default. The type II equilibrium is a twin crisis whenever the exogenous tax
base E is less than the government’s outstanding debt B, or if E/B < 1. In
this case, banking crises and sovereign debt crises are contagious in the sense
that they aggravate and reinforce each other. Whenever E exceeds B, i.e.,
E/B ≥ 1 , the government will be able to repay its debt irrespective of the
occurrence of a banking crisis. In this case, a sovereign default will never
occur, but a bank run still constitutes an equilibrium.
The parameter E (or the ratio E/B) can be interpreted as a measure of
the government’s fiscal stability. If E/B ≥ 1, the government can raise taxes
irrespective of the performance of banks which will suffice to repay the out-
standing debt. The taxable economic activity thus does not depend too much
on the provision of financial services. If E/B < 1, the government’s ability
to tax and to repay is closely linked to the banking sector, i.e., the taxable
economic activity depends strongly on the performance of the banking sector.
Therefore, whenever E/B < 1, the crisis equilibrium is not only characterized
by a banking crisis, but also by a sovereign default.
Generally, E/B < 1 is reminiscent of the crisis zone in Cole and Kehoe
(2000): when the exogenous tax base that is available irrespective of the per-
formance of the banking sector is low, runs become possible. In the following,
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we will show that this may be true irrespective of the existence of a deposit
insurance.
2.2.3 Deposit Insurance Scheme
We now analyze the effect of a deposit insurance. We define deposit insurance
to be a guarantee by the government that each consumer receives c∗1 units at
a period of his choice. If the deposit insurance is credible, it prevents patient
consumers from withdrawing early because in any contingency consumers get
at least as much in period two as in period one. In the next paragraph, we will
analyze under which conditions a deposit insurance is credible in our setup.
We assume that the government uses its tax revenue to repay its bonds first,
and only uses its remaining funds to fulfill the DIS afterwards if possible.
This ordering might seem odd at first sight because government bonds only
get repaid in period two, but the deposit insurance might already be needed
in period one. However, since the government does not have funds in period
one – recall that we assumed that the short-term tax base is zero – it will
have to borrow in order to provide a DIS. The government will only be able
to borrow and actually fulfill a deposit insurance if its outstanding debt is not
already exceeding its available funds. Therefore, the government bonds are
effectively senior to the deposit insurance.
The deposit insurance is credible if the government is able to repay its
debt and to pay for the deposit insurance in any contingency. The most
adverse contingency is the case in which all consumers withdraw early, and
the banks thus have to engage in full liquidation. A sufficient condition for
the deposit insurance to be credible is that the government can repay its debt
B. Therefore, banks can sell their pic∗1 bonds at face value. The complete
liquidation of the illiquid loan portfolio provides the banks with an additional
amount of `I units. Thus, the deposit insurance has to cover the missing funds
in order to serve the each consumer with c∗1 units. Therefore, the maximal
amount a deposit insurance might have to cover is given by DI = c∗1−`I−pic∗1.
Whenever E ≥ B + DI, the deposit insurance scheme is credible, because
the government can actually provide this amount in any contingency.
Proposition 2.2. By providing a deposit insurance scheme, the government
can eliminate the crisis equilibrium iff E ≥ B +DI.
The government is able to eliminate the crisis equilibrium whenever its
exogenous tax revenue exceeds the sum of the outstanding debt B and the
maximum cost of a deposit insurance DI. In this case, it can repay its debt
and credibly insure deposits of all consumers. The deposit insurance is never
48
2.3 Two-Country Model
tested and therefore eliminates the adverse equilibrium at no costs. For B ≤
E < B+DI, there are multiple equilibria. The government cannot prevent a
bank run because the deposit insurance scheme is not credible, but since it can
serve its debt, a rollover freeze does not occur in equilibrium. For E < B, the
government can neither prevent a bank run nor a sovereign default. Figure 2.2
shows which type of equilibria exist for different levels of E under the deposit
insurance scheme.
E0 B
sovereign default & bank run bank run
“no crisis” equilibriumtype I equilibrium
type II equilibrium
B +DI
Figure 2.2: Existence of Equilibria under the Deposit Insurance Scheme. The type I
equilibrium always exist. The type II equilibrium only exists if the deposit insurance
is not credible, i.e., if E < B+DI. It is characterized by a bank run for E ≥ B, and
by a twin crisis for E < B.
Finally, notice that the deposit insurance does not bail out banks; it only
steps in after banks have already defaulted on their liabilities. In fact, it would
be more efficient in our model to bail out banks in order to prevent them from
engaging in inefficient liquidation. However, in terms of preventing the crisis
equilibrium, a bailout mechanism would have exactly the same effects as a
DIS. The government could announce that it would bail out the banks in case
of a crisis and thereby eliminate the crisis equilibrium if the announcement
is credible. For this to be true, the government would need exactly the same
budget, i.e., B +DI.
2.3 Two-Country Model
We now consider an extended, two-country setting of the model. This allows
us to analyze under which conditions a crisis in one country may be conta-
gious, triggering a crisis in another. We will use the setup to investigate which
policies eliminate the adverse crisis equilibrium and ensure financial stability.
In our model, a country consists of domestic consumers who hold demand de-
posit contracts with domestic banks. Furthermore, there is a government that
taxes domestic economic activity. In our model, investors are not associated
with countries.
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Assume that there are two countries that are labeled homeH and foreign F .
Without loss of generality, we take the view of the home country to facilitate
the verbal interpretation of our analysis. Both countries are as described in the
single-country case and identical to each other, except for some international
financial interdependence. Furthermore, we vary the amount of exogenous
tax revenue EH and EF . A country k is called fiscally sound whenever Ek
is very high, and fiscally weak whenever Ek is low. We assume throughout
most of this section that each country implements a deposit insurance scheme
targeting domestic depositors whenever feasible. We analyze a policy setup
where both countries can form a banking union or a fiscal and banking union.
The banking union is a supranational policy tool that implements a joint
deposit insurance for both countries. When tested, the costs are borne by the
two countries jointly. We contrast these policies with a situation of political
autarky where there is no supranational policy. Throughout the analysis, we
maintain Assumptions 2.1 to 2.4 for both countries.
Importantly, we assume that countries are interdependent. We introduce
interdependency by assuming that banks of both countries hold government
bonds of both countries. While we assume this interdependence, we refer
to empirical evidence as well as to theoretical explanations why government
bond holdings are diversified.8
In a nutshell, we will present two main results: First, crises can be conta-
gious across countries once there is interdependence. A sovereign debt crisis
in the foreign country is always costly for the home country, and also triggers
a crisis in the home country if the interdependence is sufficiently strong. Sec-
ond, a fiscal and banking union may eliminate the adverse equilibrium at no
costs if joint exogenous tax revenue is sufficiently high.
2.3.1 Setup
Assume that banks in both countries still hold a portfolio of government
bonds. However, now this portfolio not only contains bonds of the domestic
country, but also bonds of the other government. In both countries, banks
hold an amount (1 − λ)αB of the domestic and λαB of the non-domestic
government bonds, where λ ∈ (0, 1). The mass of investors who are willing to
buy bonds of the respective government is denoted by ηH and ηF . When buy-
8For empirical evidence, see Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Cooper and Nikolov (2013),
who describe the cross-country holdings of government bonds in the euro area by using
the European Banking Authority Stress Test data. Moreover, cross-country holdings
of government bonds can result, e.g., from international activities of banks, or from
diversification considerations (see, e.g., Bolton and Jeanne, 2011).
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ing government bonds, investors do not discriminate based on the nationality
of banks selling the bonds.
As before, banks in the home country need to serve each early consumer with
c∗1 units in t = 1, potentially forcing them to liquidate a fraction zH(ωH , ηH , ηF )
of its loan portfolio. The budget equation of home banks in t = 1 is therefore
given by
ωHc∗1 = (1− λ)ηH + ληF + zH`I (2.6)
whenever possible. In analogy to the single-country case we can express liq-
uidation as
zH(ωH , ηH , ηF ) = min
[
1, [ω
Hc∗1 − (1− λ)ηH − ληF ]+
`I
]
. (2.7)
Observe that, in contrast to the single country case, home banks’ liquidation is
now not only a function of aggregate withdrawal and aggregate rollover in the
home country, but also a function of aggregate rollover of the foreign country’s
sovereign debt. Late consumption and tax revenue are given as above: they
are functions of the liquidation fraction, cH2 (zH , ωH) and TH(zH). Therefore,
if the foreign country defaults, which goes along a rollover freeze of foreign
debt, the consumption and the tax revenue in the home country decreases
because the countries are interdependent. We focus on a case where there is
a high degree of interdependence between the countries.
Assumption 2.5. λ ≥ c∗2−c∗1c∗2
`I
pic∗1
The assumption implies that interdependence, measured by λ, is so strong
that whenever there is a sovereign default abroad, there also is a bank run at
home – unless home depositors are kept from running by a deposit insurance
scheme. A high λ implies that once the foreign government defaults, losses of
banks at home on the foreign government bonds are also high. Assumption 2.5
implies a default abroad in fact induces a liquidation that would lower the
late consumption to a level below the promised amount of early consumption,
c2 < c
∗
1, giving patient consumers an incentive to withdraw early. For a formal
analysis, see the proof of Proposition 2.3 in the Appendix.
2.3.2 International Contagion
Let us first assume that countries do not intervene abroad, but only provide
a deposit insurance scheme to domestic depositors. As mentioned above, we
refer to this as a political autarky. We analyze how a sovereign default abroad
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(i.e., ηF = 0, possible whenever EF < B) may be contagious and affect
outcomes in the home country. In doing so, we implicitly characterize the
crisis equilibrium of the two-country economy.
Whenever there is a sovereign default abroad, the amount required to make
a deposit insurance at home credible is given by D˜I = DI + λαB. This
amount is larger than in the single-country case. In order to make the de-
posit insurance scheme credible in the two-country case, the home country’s
government has to be able to cover the losses on foreign government bonds in
addition to the cost of the deposit insurance, as specified in the single-country
setup.
Proposition 2.3. In a Nash equilibrium in which there is a sovereign default
in the foreign country, the following outcomes prevail in the home country:
EH < B Sovereign default and bank run (ωH , ηH) =
(1, 0): All consumers withdraw early and there is no
rollover, inducing full liquidation and thus resulting in
illiquidity and insolvency of both the government and
the banking sector.
EH ∈ [B,B + D˜I) Bank run (ωH , ηH) = (1, αB): Investors purchase
government debt, but all consumers withdraw early.
Although there is full liquidation, the government is
still able fully to serve its debt.
EH ≥ B + D˜I No bank run, but costly deposit insurance
(ωH , ηH) = (pi, αB): Investors purchase government
debt, and only impatient consumers withdraw early.
However, the deposit insurance scheme becomes costly.
The proof of Proposition 2.3 can be found in the Appendix. Let us discuss
these results in some more depth. In the first case, the home country has weak
fiscal fundamentals; a sovereign debt crisis abroad will always trigger a twin
crisis in the home country as well. In the second case, EH is in an intermediate
range and the home country can repay its debt for sure, but it cannot provide
a credible deposit insurance. In this case, banks in the home country make a
loss of λpic∗1 = λαB, forcing them to liquidate a share of their loan portfolio,
which triggers a bank run. Finally, in the third case, the fiscal fundamentals
are strong and the home country can credibly promise to repay its debt and
insure its deposits. Therefore, the home country can rule out a bank run at
home once the foreign country defaults. However, the crisis abroad remains
contagious in that banks incur a loss of λαB. Because the remaining funds
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of banks in t = 2 are smaller than (1 − pi)c∗1 by Assumption 2.5, the deposit
insurance scheme has to step in. The results of Proposition 2.3 are depicted
in the lower area of Figure 2.3, for EF < B. The three different scenarios are
represented by the areas I to III.
2.3.3 Optimal Policies: Supranational Institutions
We have seen that a crisis abroad causes real losses for home banks and is
thus contagious under political autarky even if the home government is able
to provide a credible deposit insurance. However, it might be possible to pre-
vent the crisis abroad through the implementation of adequate supranational
institutions. We are looking for institutions that constitute a Pareto improve-
ment compared to the situation of political autarky, in the sense that both
countries weakly benefit from this policy. We focus on two different institu-
tional setups: first, the implementation of a banking union, and second, the
joint implementation of a banking union and a fiscal union. In our model, a
banking union describes a supranational institution that provides a deposit
insurance scheme for both countries and is financed by both countries. Sim-
ilarly, in a fiscal union, both countries mutualize sovereign debt and promise
to repay the debt of both countries together.
Proposition 2.4. Assume EH + EF ≥ 2(B +DI) and EH > EF .
EF < E˜ A banking union is Pareto-efficient only if it is com-
plemented with a fiscal union.
EF ∈ [E˜, B +DI) A banking union is required for Pareto efficiency, but
a fiscal union is not necessary.
EF ≥ B +DI Remaining in political autarky is Pareto-efficient,
there is no need for a banking or fiscal union.
The threshold E˜ is defined as E˜ = B − [`I−(1−λ)pic∗1]+`I τRI.
The assumption of EH + EF ≥ 2(B + DI) implies that the pooled ex-
ogenous tax revenues of both countries suffice to repay the government debt
and credibly to insure the depositors of both countries. Let us go backwards
to illustrate the results of Proposition 2.4. If EF ≥ B + DI, the foreign
government is fiscally sound and can prevent a crisis by providing a deposit
insurance scheme on its own, so Pareto efficiency is already attained under
political autarky. As soon as EF < B + DI, the foreign country cannot
provide a credible deposit insurance any more and a bank run can occur.
Therefore, a joint deposit insurance is needed. Based on the level of EF ,
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EH
0
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2(B +DI)
B +DI
B
B 2(B +DI)B +DI
B + D˜I
B + D˜I
I
II
III
II III
IV
V
V
VI
I Twin crisis in both countries
II Twin crisis in fiscally weak
country, bank run in fiscally
sound country
III Twin crisis in fiscally weak
country, no crisis in fis-
cally sound country, but DIS
costly
IV No contagion, no sovereign
default, independent bank-
ing crises
V No contagion, no sovereign
default, banking crisis in fis-
cally weak country
VI No crisis equilibrium
Figure 2.3: Equilibria under Political Autarky. This figure depicts the types of
crisis equilibria in the case of political autarky (each government only provides a DIS
for domestic depositors) for different values of external tax revenues EH and EF .
In region I, the crisis equilibrium is a twin crisis (sovereign default and bank run)
in both countries. In region II, the fiscally weak country defaults and experiences a
bank run, while the fiscally sound country does not default, but experiences a banking
crisis. In region III, there is a twin crisis in the fiscally weak country and no crisis in
the fiscally sound country, but the DIS is costly. In region IV, one country or both
countries experience a banking crisis, but sovereigns do not default and there is no
contagion. The banking crises can occur independently of each other. In region V,
there is a banking crisis in the fiscally weak country, but no contagion, and no crisis
in the fiscally sound country. In region VI, no crisis equilibrium exists.
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we have to make one further case distinction. Notice that even though the
banking union prevents a bank run, banks might have to liquidate because
of a rollover freeze. The rollover freeze can only occur if EF < E˜. As long
as EF is above this threshold, the remaining tax revenue after liquidation
suffices to repay the government bonds B. Because the rollover freeze is ruled
out, the banking union is a sufficient measure. However, if the exogenous tax
revenue falls below this threshold, the rollover freeze can only be ruled out
by the additional implementation of a fiscal union through which the home
government guarantees the repayment of foreign government debt.
The results are depicted in Figure 2.4. Proposition 2.4 is concerned with
the area above the dashed line, where EH +EF ≥ 2(B+DI). In region (i) no
union is required. A banking union is strict Pareto improvement in regions
(ii) and (iii), whereas in region (iv) the implementation of both a banking and
a fiscal union is required.
We conclude that if the countries are sufficiently different with respect to
their exogenous tax revenue, it may be beneficial for both countries to form
a banking union as this eliminates the adverse crisis equilibrium at no costs.
Discussion
Notice that there is no uncertainty regarding fiscal soundness in our model,
i.e., it is clear which country is fiscally weak and which country is fiscally
strong. However, both countries have an incentive to form a banking union or
even a fiscal union. The type of unions discussed can therefore be understood
as something that is different from typical insurance against potential adverse
states in the future. A typical insurance would be a contract between agents
which is signed before relevant states are realized and which aims at insuring
at least one of the contracting parties. Typically, there is ex post one party
that makes losses on the contract because it has to transfer net funds to the
other party.
In our case, however, the insurance contract can be signed after the values of
external tax revenues, EH and EF , are realized because there is no transfer of
funds from the strong to the weak country. In contrast, both countries benefit
from this atypical insurance even ex post, even though the union might be
valued more by the fiscally weak than by the fiscally strong country. Because it
is effective in preventing self-fulfilling crises, the unions are costless for both
countries. This consideration implies that if there was initial uncertainty
about which of the two countries is the strong one and which is the weak one,
both countries would have an incentive to form the union.
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2(B +DI)
B +DI
B
E˜
BE˜ 2(B +DI)B +DI
B + D˜I
B + D˜I
(v)
(iv)
(iv)
(iii)
(iii)
(ii)
(ii)
(i)
(i) Political autarky is Pareto-
efficient, no crisis
(ii) Banking union is a Pareto
improvement, fiscally weak
country benefits
(iii) Banking union is a Pareto
improvement, both coun-
tries benefit
(iv) Fiscal and banking union is
a Pareto improvement
(v) Crisis cannot be prevented
Figure 2.4: Efficient Policy Measures. This figure depicts regions in which the crisis
equilibrium can be eliminated by either a banking union or the joint implementation
of a Banking and fiscal union for different values of external tax revenues EH and
EF . In region (i), a crisis equilibrium does not exist even under political autarky,
thus a union is not needed. In region (ii), a banking union stabilizes the weaker
country by ruling out a bank run. While it does not benefit the stronger country,
it does not cost anything either. In region (iii), the banking union rules out a bank
run and a sovereign default of the weaker country, thus benefiting both countries.
Finally, in region (iv), the banking union is not effective anymore. Here, only the
joint implementation of banking and fiscal union can eliminate the crisis, and it is
costless for both countries. If the sum of exogenous tax revenues is too small, it is
not possible to rule out crisis equilibria by forming a union (region (v)). While the
fiscally stronger country might experience neither a sovereign default nor a bank run,
it suffers whenever the weaker country experiences a sovereign default.
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2.4 The European Banking Union
We now use the insights of our model to investigate the efficacy of recent
policy proposals. The proclaimed goal of the proposal for the implementation
of a banking union in the euro area is to ensure financial stability and to
break the “potentially vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” (European
Commission, 2013a).
The current proposals for the formation of a banking union consist of three
components. First, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is sup-
posed to be complemented by a single rulebook of the European Banking
Authority (Council of the European Union, 2013). Second, the Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism (SRM) for the centralization of competencies and resources
for managing the failure of banks (European Commission, 2013b). Third, a
supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS).
Currently, the first two components are already implemented (SSM) or close
to being implemented (SRM), but a supranational deposit insurance scheme
so far seems to be politically infeasible and is currently off the table (Euro-
pean Commission, 2013a). Hellwig (2014) points out several doubts about the
effectiveness of SSM and SRM at dealing with cross-boarder externalities, es-
pecially for the case of banks that operate in several countries. Furthermore,
he points out that national authorities may be unable or unwilling to provide
funding in case of a crisis, calling for a fiscal backstop at the European level.
Our model points to a further problem: We show that the lack of a suprana-
tional DGS may be a serious shortcoming of the European Banking Union,
and may undermine the overall efficacy of the proposed reforms in ensuring
financial stability.
Note that due to the stylized nature of our model there is no role for super-
vision and resolution of banks. Thus, our model remains silent on the efficacy
of the components of the banking union that have already been or are about
to be implemented (supervision and resolution). Clearly, both components
are crucial for harmonizing banking regulation on the European level and
may well be considered as a key achievement.
In turn, our model can actually say something on the supranational DGS,
the component policy makers currently seem to refuse to implement. Our
model states that if there is sufficient interdependence between countries and
a high degree of heterogeneity in the countries’ fiscal soundness, a banking
union as well as a fiscal union may eliminate the self-fulfilling crisis equilib-
rium. Observe that in fact banks are highly interconnected within the euro
area. Moreover, observe that there are countries that may be considered
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fiscally sound (e.g., Germany and France), and others that may be consid-
ered fiscally weak (e.g., Spain and Italy).9 If one is willing to believe in the
self-fulfilling nature of financial crises, a deposit insurance scheme, poten-
tially complemented by a fiscal union, may implement financial stability at
no costs. This also implies that the refusal to implement a deposit insurance
scheme may lead to potentially costly contagion across countries, which could
be avoided.
A deposit insurance scheme works best if it is credible and never tested
and thus eliminates the possibility of self-fulfilling crises at no costs. In order
to understand the importance of this insight in the context of the European
situation, consider the following: Assume that there is a fiscally sound country
that would never experience a self-fulfilling crisis if it was in autarky. However,
its interdependence with another country implies its banks will realize losses
once there is a crisis in the foreign country. Thus, ensuring domestic financial
stability through, e.g., a deposit insurance scheme will become costly for the
government once its banks have realized losses. A crisis abroad may therefore
cause real costs at home once there is sufficient interdependence. Given the
self-fulfilling nature of the crisis abroad, it may be optimal for the home
country to participate in a mechanism that prevents the crisis abroad at low
(or even at zero) costs. Preventing the crisis abroad eliminates contagion and
thus ensures financial stability at home in this setting. Our model shows that
this is possible by implementing a banking union (equivalent to a joint deposit
insurance scheme in our model) which is complemented with a fiscal union if
necessary.
In order to apply this insight to the European situation, one needs to ap-
preciate the fact that a deposit insurance in fiscally weak countries may not
be credible. It may therefore not be able to prevent a banking crisis in the
respective country, a crisis that can be contagious and thus costly for fis-
cally sound countries as well. A banking union with a joint deposit insurance
scheme may increase the credibility of the deposit insurance. In fact, the de-
posit insurance scheme may become fully credible once it is backed by fiscally
sound governments, eliminating the crisis equilibrium altogether. In fact, in
our very simple setup, such a mechanism can eliminate the crisis equilibrium
at no cost.
One may hypothesize that politicians in fiscally sound countries currently
9We do not consider our model to fit the case of Greece. It is more than questionable
whether Greece could have repaid its debt even if its debt had been a rolled over. The
crisis in Greece does not appear to be only self-fulfilling, but rather due to fundamen-
tal problems. Greece and Portugal rather had “old-fashioned sovereign debt crises”
(Hellwig, 2014).
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seem to be scared of implementing a joint deposit insurance scheme. The
rationale is that it could appeal to voters as another form of mutualization
of national debt, with a clear disadvantage for taxpayers in fiscally sound
countries. E.g., German politicians may fear to scare their voters as a banking
union may imply that German tax payer can potentially be liable for losses
of, e.g., Spanish banks. Our model indicates that this may turn out to be
bitter irony: exactly the refusal of implementing a full-fledged banking union
with a joint deposit insurance scheme may make future crises more costly for
the respective tax payers.
2.5 Conclusion
Our model has two main contributions. First, we discuss how banking crises
and sovereign defaults can be contagious across countries. The setup allows
us to rationalize supranational policies that aim at preventing sovereign and
financial crises. Our specific setup gives conditions under which a fiscal and
a banking union are effective measures to eliminate an adverse run equilib-
rium. We use these results to comment on the policy debates on the making
of a banking union in the euro area. Importantly, our model indicates that a
banking union with a joint deposit insurance scheme may be a mechanism to
prevent contagious self-fulfilling banking crises. It possibly has to be comple-
mented by a fiscal union to be entirely effective. We argue that the current
proposal for a banking union, consisting only of supranational supervision
and resolution mechanisms, is insufficient to break the vicious cycle between
sovereigns and banks.
Second, the model illustrates the risks associated with banks holding gov-
ernment bonds. In our model, fragility arises whenever the fate of the govern-
ment and the financial sector are closely connected. This condition is likely
met in developed and highly leveraged financial systems where banks hold
government bonds and where economic activity depends on the performance
of the financial sector. This chapter thus sheds light on the debate regarding
the regulation of government bonds holding by intermediaries. More specifi-
cally, it gives a rationale for why exposure of banks to sovereign risk may be
problematic.
The stylized nature of our model implies that our insights and policy im-
plications have to be taken with a grain of salt and cannot be translated
one-to-one for every institutional arrangement. In our model, we abstract
from fundamental uncertainty (i.e., macroeconomic shocks) as a source of a
crisis, and from potential moral hazard resulting from an established banking
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and fiscal union. Both elements may be of importance in reality. For the
case of negative macroeconomic shocks in a foreign country, a supranational
deposit insurance may moderate a crisis, but this might come with real costs
for the home country. In addition, the presence of an international insurance
may induce a country’s institutions (government, supervision, and banks) to
gamble. Both aspects might induce fiscally strong countries to refrain from
a fiscal and an extensive banking union. This is not an argument against
such unions, though. It rather calls for detailed contractual definitions of
the union’s scope, and for strict regulation and supervision that is located
at level of the union. The SSM and SRM can mitigate such moral hazard
on the country level, and thus build the foundation which is necessary for
implementing a supranational DGS.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We first analyze proof the existence of the Type I
equilibrium where (ω, η) = (pi, αB): By Equation (2.1), banks do not engage
in liquidation, z(ω, η) = 0, yielding a late consumption of c2 = c∗2 and a
tax revenue of T = E + τRI. Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3, and Equations (2.3)
and (2.5) imply that patient consumers do not withdraw early, ω∗i (ω, η) =
0 ∀i, and outside investors roll over the debt η∗j (ω, η) = 1 ∀j. Therefore
(ω, η) = (pi, pic∗1) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium.
We now proof the existence of the Type II equilibrium. We distinguish two
cases.
E < B Sovereign default and bank run (ω, η) = (1, 0):
The liquidation is given by z(ω, η) = 1, yielding c2 = 0 and T = E. We get
ω∗i (ω, η) = 1 ∀i and η∗j (ω, η) = 0 ∀j. Therefore (ω, η) = (1, 0) constitutes a
Nash Equilibrium.
E ≥ B Bank run (ω, η) = (1, αB):
The liquidation is given by z(ω, η) = 1, yielding c2 = 0 and T = E. We get
ω∗i (ω, η) = 1 ∀i and η∗j (ω, η) = 1 ∀j. Therefore (ω, η) = (1, αB) constitutes a
Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. A sovereign default in the foreign country implies
that ηF = 0, implying that domestic banks make a loss of (1 − h)αB. As-
sumption 2.5 implies that this loss induces a liquidation which necessarily
triggers a bank run in the home country in the absence of the a deposit insur-
ance. To prove this fact, we show that even if there was rollover of sovereign
debt and no run, depositors would still prefer to run, i.e., cH2 < c∗1. In this
case, the liquidation would be zH(pi, αB, 0) = (pic∗1−(1−λ)pic∗1)/`I = λpic∗1/`I.
By Assumption 2.5, it follows that zH > c
∗
2−c∗1
c∗2
= 1− c∗1c∗2 . Late consumption is
given by cH2 (zH , pi) = (1 − zH)c∗2. It follows that cH2 (zH , pi) < (c∗1/c∗2)c∗2 = c∗1.
Therefore, the bank run is inevitable in the absence of a deposit insurance.
EH < B: Sovereign default and bank run, (ωH , ηH) = (1, 0)
Because the government cannot provide a deposit insurance, a bank run is
triggered. This leads to full liquidation and reduces the tax revenue to TH =
EH < B, inducing a sovereign default and a rollover freeze.
EH ∈ [B,B + D˜I): Bank run, (ωH , ηH) = (1, αB)
Because the government cannot provide a deposit insurance, a bank run is
triggered. This leads to full liquidation and reduces the tax revenue to TH =
EH > B. The sovereign can repay its debt, and rollover is ensured.
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EH ≥ B + D˜I: No Bank run but costly deposit insurance,
(ωH , ηH) = (pi, αB)
The government can provide a deposit insurance scheme and thus prevent
a bank run, and it can also repay its debt, ensuring the rollover of debt.
However, the deposit insurance is costly.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Given that EF ≥ B + DI, it is immediately clear
that both countries are stable under political autarky, therefore a union is not
needed.
In the presence of a banking union, the foreign government cannot ex-
perience a sovereign debt crisis if EF ≥ E˜. Because joint funds suffice to
make a banking union credible, it prevents a run in the foreign country. If
there was a rollover freeze in the foreign country, banks would have to liqui-
date zF (pi, 0, αB) = min[1, (1 − λ)pic∗1/(`I)]. This induces a tax revenue of
TF (zF ) ≥ E˜+ [`I−(1−λ)pic∗1]+`I τRI = B. The foreign government can thus repay
its debt, and a rollover freeze cannot occur in equilibrium. Therefore, the
banking union is sufficient to eliminate any crisis altogether if EF ≥ E˜.
If however EF < E˜, a rollover freeze constitutes an equilibrium even in the
presence of a banking union which prevents a bank run. In case of a rollover
freeze, the tax revenue is given by TF (zF ) < E˜ + [`I−(1−λ)pic
∗
1]+
`I τRI = B.
Therefore, the joint implementation of the banking and the fiscal union is
required. This policy measure is costless for the home country because by
providing the deposit insurance and guaranteeing to repay all government
debt, it rules out a bank run and ensures rollover of foreign government debt.
The deposit insurance will not be tested, and because foreign banks do not
engage in liquidation, the foreign government has sufficient tax revenue to
repay its debt by itself.
Returning to the case of EF ∈ [E˜, B−DI], we can distinguish two different
scenarios. If EF ∈ [E˜, B], both countries strictly benefit from the implemen-
tation of the banking union. The foreign country does not experience any
crisis, and because the default of the foreign sovereign is ruled out, losses
of home banks on foreign government bonds are eliminated. In contrast, if
EF ∈ [B,B +DI), the foreign country will always be able to repay its debt.
Therefore, the home country cannot be affected by a crisis at all. Even if
there was a bank run in the foreign country, the home country would not
suffer because the exposure is only through foreign debt which is unaffected.
Thus, only the foreign country benefits from the banking union, but the home
country does not suffer. This distinction is illustrated by the regions (ii) and
(iii) in Figure 2.4.
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Regulatory Arbitrage and Systemic
Liquidity Crises
3.1 Introduction
Regulatory arbitrage has been identified as one of the main ingredients to
the 2007-09 financial crisis (FCIC, 2011; Acharya et al., 2013). Hence, post-
crisis reforms have targeted the main channels through which the turmoil
in the shadow banking sector has affected the commercial banking sector,
particularly, explicit or implicit contractual linkages between the two sectors.
A natural question that arises in this context is whether the implemented and
proposed reforms are effective in shielding the commercial banking sector in
future crises?
This chapter discusses a new theoretical channel for how regulatory arbi-
trage in banking may contribute to overall financial fragility. We show that
regulatory arbitrage may set the stage for panic-based runs in the shadow
banking sector, which may affect the regulated banking sector via a deterio-
ration of wholesale funding conditions. The non-regulated banking activities
may thus affect the commercial banking sector via channels beyond those that
have been targeted in the post-crisis reforms. We argue that restrictions on
wholesale funding may be justified if the objective is to ensure stability of
depository institutions in the presence of regulatory arbitrage.
Previous to the 2007-09 financial crisis, many commercial banks had set
up off-balance sheet conduits to finance long-term real investment by issuing
short-term debt. In the summer of 2007, increased delinquency rates on sub-
prime mortgages ultimately led to the collapse of the conduits’ main source
of funding: the market for asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP) (see, e.g.,
Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2009; Covitz et al., 2013). Many commercial banks
had explicitly or implicitly sponsored these conduits,1 and the collapse forced
1Asset-backed commercial paper conduits were set up to finance mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) by issuing ABCP or medium-term notes
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those banks to take the conduits’ asset and liabilities on their balance-sheets,
thus creating severe solvency issues.
From an ex-post perspective, it appears that off-balance sheet banking had
to a large extent been conducted to circumvent existing capital regulation
(see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2013).2 In this context, the adverse implications of
explicit as well as implicit contractual linkages between regulated and unreg-
ulated banks have been identified as a particularly important source of insta-
bility (Segura, 2014). Consequentially, the overwhelming regulatory response
has been to close the obvious loopholes in regulation by outright prohibition
of contractual links between depository institutions and other parts of the fi-
nancial system (compare, e.g., Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, referred to
as the “Volcker Rule”, Report of the Vickers Commission, Liikanen Report).
In this chapter, we show that if intermediation optimally relies on wholesale
funding, regulatory arbitrage poses a real threat to overall financial stability
even in the absence of any contractual linkages between commercial banks
and shadow banking activities. The main mechanism is that panic-based
runs in the shadow banking sector may induce fire sales. A binding cash-in-
the-market constraint may then also lead to a deterioration of the wholesale
funding conditions for regulated banks. Contagion via the deterioration of
funding conditions creates real costs for commercial banks and potentially
leads to their illiquidity and insolvency. Moreover, these costs grow with the
size of the shadow banking sector, as a larger shadow banking sector induces
stronger fire-sale effects.
We argue that understanding such mechanisms is particularly important in
the light of the new regulations implemented in the aftermath of the 07-09
financial crisis. Many of the new regulatory measures have been implemented
under the premise that a prohibition of explicit or implicit contractual link-
ages between commercial banking and other types of banking can shield the
former from turmoil originating in the latter. In particular, regulation has
focused on prohibiting sponsor support, as well as on the separation of tra-
ditional banking and other activities, such as proprietary trading and market
making.3 At the same time, the question has been raised whether deposi-
(MTN), and were granted explicit credit or liquidity guarantees, or implicit guarantees
as in the case of structured investment vehicles (SIV).
2To some observers, this had already been clear prior to the crisis; see Jones (2000).
3E.g., the Financial Services Act of 2013, which was based in the Vickers Commissions
Report, suggests a limit on the exposure of depository institutions to other financial
institution within the same bank holding company. Likewise, the Liikanen Report
distinguishes between the “deposit bank” and the “trading entity” within the same
bank holding company. The “Volcker Rule” limits proprietary trading activities in
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tory institutions should be allowed to fund some of their activities by using
wholesale funding. The Basel III liquidity regulation proposes to restrict the
holding of illiquid assets and the reliance on unstable funding sources by in-
troducing the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio
(NSFR).
This chapter sheds new light on how these measures affect financial stability
in the presence of regulatory arbitrage. We argue that prohibiting contractual
linkages is not sufficient to shield the regulated banking sector from financial
fragility. It may be desirable to implement further restrictions on commercial
banks. In particular, we show that, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage,
restricting wholesale funding in depository institutions allows shielding the
regulated banking sector from the consequences of turmoil in the unregulated
shadow banking sector. Such macroprudential reasoning calls for liquidity reg-
ulation of depository institutions. However, we indicate that such regulation
may achieve financial stability at the expense of allocative inefficiencies and
lead to further growth of fragile shadow banking. Moreover, we argue that, in
the context of the Basel III liquidity regulation, an explicitly macroprudential
approach to regulation would be crucial for its efficacy. In particular, we use
our model to argue that one should be more restrictive when declaring which
assets are considered as liquid and which sources of funding are considered as
stable in case of a systemic liquidity crisis.
Our model builds on – and at the same time nests – the banking model of
maturity and liquidity transformation by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We
enrich the setup along two dimensions: On the one hand, we introduce a
new type of agents, called “investors”. These agents are only present from
the interim period onwards and can provide funds to banks in exchange for
claims on future cash-flows, as in Chapter 1. This makes it optimal for in-
termediation to use what we refer to as “wholesale funding” instead of using
storage. On the other hand, we introduce a shirking technology that allows a
disciplining role of short-term debt, reminiscent of Calomiris and Kahn (1991)
and Diamond and Rajan (2001). First, we show that the disciplining effect of
short-term debt allows intermediaries to implement the first-best allocation in
our setup. Intermediaries refrain from shirking as they cannot enjoy private
benefits if their depositors collectively withdraw. We also show that while
short-term debt may be disciplining, it is also necessarily associated with the
possibility of panic-based runs, as discussed by Admati and Hellwig (2013).
A regulator that decides to provide a deposit insurance to eliminate panic-
based runs would thus undermine the disciplining effect of short-term debt.
depository institutions.
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This makes it necessary to complement a safety net with equity regulation,
which induces diligent behavior via a textbook skin-in-the-game mechanism
à la Tirole (2010).
Assuming that such equity regulation is costly, incentives to circumvent
regulation may arise, and intermediaries may place themselves outside the
regulatory perimeter in the so-called shadow banking sector. Institutions in
this sector are not covered by the deposit insurance and have no access to the
central bank’s discount lending, implying that they can be subject to panic-
based runs. We emphasize a new theoretical channel through which these runs
may be contagious, affecting the regulated banking sector: A systemic run on
shadow banks induces fire sales with cash-in-the-market pricing à la Allen and
Gale (1994). A binding cash-in-the-market constraint implies that wholesale
funding conditions also deteriorate in a fire sale. As regulated commercial
banks optimally rely on wholesale funding, a fire sale creates real costs for
them. Depending on the size of the shadow banking sector, regulated banks
may ultimately become insolvent, and the provision of a deposit insurance
may become costly. This contagion channel can be shut down by prohibiting
wholesale funding or regulated banks. These restrictions do, however, lead
to allocative inefficiencies in the regulated sector and increase the size of the
shadow banking sector.
Throughout our main analysis, we treat runs on shadow banks as zero-
probability events. In order to show that our results are robust to anticipated
runs, we analyze the effects of sunspot runs that occur with positive proba-
bilities, as in Cooper and Ross (1998). Naturally, the shadow banking sector
becomes less attractive when runs are anticipated. However, this does not
lead to a complete breakdown of shadow banking. Moreover, runs in the
shadow banking sector also affect the regulated banking sectors’ expected re-
financing conditions and thus also make the intermediation of regulated banks
less attractive. This mitigates the effect which anticipated runs in the shadow
banking sector have on the relative attractiveness of the regulated banking
sector. In this context, we also briefly analyze how government interventions
in the form of a Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) and a Market Maker of Last
Resort (MMLR) may affect the stability of the financial system. We find that
while these interventions can shield the regulated banks, they necessarily also
benefit the shadow banks.
Finally, we also discuss the role of direct contractual linkages between the
two sectors in the form of liquidity guarantees. We show that liquidity guar-
antees are optimal from the perspective of a single institution, but they exac-
erbate the adverse consequences of runs in the shadow banking sector. This
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shows that the prohibition of contractual linkages may indeed be desirable.
We argue, however, that prohibiting links alone is not enough to shield regu-
lated banks from financial instability.
Literature
This chapter connects to the recent literature on theoretical aspects of shadow
banking. The paper by Bolton et al. (2011) presents a model in which inter-
mediaries originate assets, and can sell them on a secondary market to raise
“outside liquidity”. Similar to their paper, we discuss how the presence of
such outside liquidity may affect the business model of banks. However, we
abstract from adverse selection and emphasize the role of coordination.
Our modeling approach is also related to the papers by Martin et al. (2014a),
Martin et al. (2014b), and Luck and Schempp (2014a). All three rely on the
setup of Qi (1994). Martin et al. (2014a) investigate the differences between
bilateral and tri-party repo in determining the stability of single financial
institutions. Martin et al. (2014b) focus on the difference between runs on
single institutions and systemic runs in secured funding markets. While our
model has a similar notion of cash-in-the-market pricing, our focus lies on
the effects of regulation and in particular on the adverse effects of shadow
banking on regulated banks. In this respect, this chapter is close to Luck
and Schempp (2014a), who analyze the effects of shadow banking on financial
stability in the presence of contractual linkages between the two sectors. The
crucial difference to Luck and Schempp (2014a) is that this chatper focuses
on contagion in the absence of contractual linkages.
Segura (2014) explicitly discusses the role of liquidity guarantees. In par-
ticular, he gives a theoretical answer to the question posed by Acharya et al.
(2013) on why banks supported their SIVs despite the absence of direct con-
tractual linkages. While Segura elegantly shows how regulated banks may
have incentives to support their shadow bank operation in order to preserve
their reputation, we argue that there may be reasons to believe that regula-
tory arbitrage may affect stability of regulated banks beyond such contractual
linkages.
Other important contributions that deal with shadow banking are Ordoñez
(2013), Gennaioli et al. (2013) and Plantin (2014). Gennaioli et al. (2013)
provide a model in which the demand for safe debt drives securitization, and
fragility in the shadow banking sector arises when tail-risk is neglected. Or-
doñez focuses on potential moral hazard on the part of banks. In his model,
shadow banking is potentially welfare-enhancing as it allows one to circumvent
imperfect regulation. However, it is only stable if shadow banks value their
reputation and thus behave diligently; it becomes fragile otherwise. Plantin
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studies the optimal prudential capital regulation when regulatory arbitrage
is possible. In his paper, relaxed capital requirements lead to a decline of
the shadow banking sector, potentially improving welfare. In contrast to all
three, we focus on the destabilizing effects of shadow banking in the sense
that it gives rise to run equilibria.
3.2 Setup
Consider an economy that goes through a sequence of three dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
There is a single good that can be used for consumption as well as for in-
vestment. The economy is populated by three types of agents: consumers,
intermediaries, and investors.
Technologies
Altogether, there are three technologies available for investment (see a sum-
mary of the payoff structure in Figure 3.1). There is a short technology (“stor-
age”) available in t = 0, 1, transforming one unit invested in t into one unit in
t+ 1. Moreover, there are two illiquid technologies available for investment in
t = 0: a “productive technology” and an unproductive “shirking technology”.
Both technologies are technologically illiquid, i.e., for one unit invested they
produce a return in t = 1 only if they are physically liquidated, and the phys-
ical liquidation rate of the technologies is assumed to be `→ 0. Note that the
technologies (or claims on the technologies’ future returns) may nonetheless
be sold at higher values at a secondary market that will be specified below.
The return properties of the illiquid technologies in t = 2 are as follows:
One unit invested in the productive technology yields a safe return of R units
in t = 2. One unit invested in the shirking technology yields a safe return of
Rshirk < 1 in t = 2. However, this technology yields a private benefit B > 0 in
t = 2 which is available only to the agent who owns investment at this point
in time, i.e., it is non-transferable and non-contractible. Moreover, it only
accrues if the technology is not physically liquidated in the interim period.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Storage in t = 0 -1 1 0
Storage in t = 1 0 -1 1
Productive technology -1 `→ 0 R
Shirking technology -1 `→ 0 Rshirk +B
Figure 3.1: Payoff structure of technologies
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We assume that Rshirk+B ≤ 1. This implies that the shirking technology is
inefficient, although it generates a private benefit. As will become clear later,
the possibility of investing in this technology and financing the investment by
short-term debt will give rise to moral hazard. This moral hazard will lead
to the necessity of capital regulation once a deposit insurance undermines the
disciplining effect of short-term debt.
Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers with mass one. Initially, consumers face
idiosyncratic uncertainty with regard to their preferred date of consumption,
and they may lend their endowment to intermediaries to invest on their be-
half.4
Each consumer is endowed with 1 unit of the good in t = 0. There are
two types of consumers, patient and impatient consumers: a fraction pi is
impatient and derives utility only from consumption in t = 1, u(c1), and a
fraction 1 − pi is patient and derives utility only from consumption in t = 2,
u(c2). We restrict attention to CRRA utility, i.e., the period-utility function
has the form u(ct) = 11−ηc
1−η
t , with η > 1.
Initially, consumers do not know their type; their probability of being im-
patient is identical and independent, so all consumers have the same prior pi
initially. In period one, each consumer privately learns his type, this can be
considered as a liquidity shock.
A consumption profile (c1, c2) denotes an allocation where an impatient
consumer receives c1 and a patient consumer receives c2. As of period 0, such
a consumption profile induces an expected utility of
U(c1, c2) = piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2) = 11− η
[
pic1−η1 + (1− pi)c1−η2
]
. (3.1)
Notice that the attributes patient and impatient characterize the consumer’s
exogenous type, which determines his preference. In contrast, the attributes
late and early will characterize the timing of actual consumption, and in
the case of demand-deposit contracts, it denotes the withdrawals, which are
endogenous: An “early consumer” withdraws in t = 1, while a “late consumer”
withdraws in t = 2.
4We assume that consumers cannot invest in technologies directly in the initial stage and
trade technologies in the interim period. They can only lend their funds to intermedi-
aries. In a later section, we will argue briefly why we can focus on a banking solution
directly, i.e., why a banking solution dominates a financial markets solution.
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Intermediaries
There is a mass m of intermediaries.5 While consumers cannot invest in the
technologies directly, intermediaries face no investment restrictions. Interme-
diaries have no market power, they compete for the consumers’ funds which
they collect in exchange for a demand-deposit contract, and they invest the
funds in the technologies. Moreover, they may choose to invest some of their
own funds in the intermediation business.
Intermediaries only care about t = 2 consumption.6 Each intermediary is
endowed with E units of the good. We assume that E is large, implying
that no result will be driven by the aggregate intermediaries’ endowment
mE becoming a binding resource constraint. Importantly, intermediaries are
assumed to have an outside option, resulting in a required return of ρ > R
in t = 2 for each unit invested in t = 0. Because the required return is
larger than the technologies’ returns, it is costly for the consumers if the
intermediaries invest their own endowment for investment. As we will see
later, this assumption makes it costly to use a skin-in-the-game mechanism
in order to provide intermediaries with incentives to invest in the productive
technology instead of in the shirking technology in the presence of a deposit
insurance.
On the liability side, intermediaries initially offer the deposit contract (c1, c2)
to consumers in exchange for one unit of initial deposits. Moreover, interme-
diaries choose to invest e0 units of their endowment in the intermediation
business in t = 0, in exchange for receiving e2 units in t = 2. While we do
not initially impose restrictions on how intermediaries finance intermediation,
equity financing will turn out to be optimal.
On the asset side, intermediaries make the following investment decision:
We denote by I the investment in the productive technology, by Ishirk the
investment in the shirking technology, and 1 + e0 − I − Ishirk denotes the
investment in storage. We assume that an intermediary’s investment decision
is unobservable in t = 0, but becomes public information in t = 1.
Investors
There is a continuum of investors of mass n. Investors only become active in
the interim period and can provide liquidity to intermediaries: Investors can
5It is assumed that m is small compared to the mass of depositors such that each bank
has a very large number of depositors, and thus does not face aggregate liquidity risk
by a law of large numbers argument.
6As the model has no aggregate uncertainty, the shape of intermediaries’ utility is not
important. They may be risk-neutral or risk-averse. Only for the case of sunspot runs
with positive probability we will assume that intermediaries are risk-neutral in order to
keep the analysis tractable.
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transfer some of their endowment to intermediaries in exchange for a claim
on some of the future returns of the intermediaries’ technologies. We refer to
this activity as “wholesale funding”. Later, we will show that the presence of
these investors makes investment in storage inefficient, i.e., it is optimal for
intermediaries to rely on wholesale funding from outsiders instead of storing
real goods. However, this will also give rise to the main contagion channel
between regulated and unregulated banking: When a run on shadow banks
induces a fire sale, a cash-in-the-market constraint can become binding, and
wholesale funding conditions for regulated banks deteriorate as well.
Investors are born in t = 1 and receive an endowment of A/n, so the
investors’ aggregate endowment is given by A. The endowment A will be one
of the crucial parameters of the model: while it may be a sufficient source
of liquidity in normal times, it may lead to a binding cash-in-the-market
constraint in case of systemic runs. Given that investors are born in t =
1, it is not possible to contract with them in t = 0. Investors care about
consumption7 in period 2, and they are assumed to have an outside option,
which induces a required return of γ, where γ ∈ [1, R]. That is, for each unit
they transfer to intermediaries in t = 1, they need to receive at least γ units
in t = 2.
Investors have no market power and thus are price takers as long as their
liquidity A is not scarce, i.e., they take the conditions of wholesale funding as
given. The required return γ implies that they are willing to provide liquidity
as long as the return r they receive satisfies r ≥ γ.
There are two different contractual specifications of wholesale funding (i.e.,
of how investors provide liquidity to intermediaries) which are economically
equivalent: asset sales and collateralized lending. If investors purchase assets
with a face value of R in period 2 at a price p in period 1, they get a return
of r = R/p. On the other hand, they can also lend one unit to banks at the
interest rate r = R/p while receiving r/R = 1/p units of asset as collateral.
As long as liquidity is not scarce, competition among investors will induce
r = γ. However, if liquidity becomes scarce, we assume that the asset price
and the interest charged in collateralized lending is determined by a cash-in-
the-market constraint.
7Again, the shape of their utility function is not important as long as it is compatible
with the specified outside option.
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3.3 Optimal Intermediation and Runs
3.3.1 First-Best
We will now derive the allocation that maximizes the expected utility of
consumers, subject to the participation constraints of intermediaries and in-
vestors, and subject to the resource constraints. Since our objective is to max-
imize consumers’ welfare, we treat these participation constraints as resource
constraints. We refer to the resulting allocation as the first-best allocation
and denote it by (c∗1, c∗2).
In the first-best, the shirking technology is not used because the productive
technology strictly dominates the shirking technology, i.e., Ishirk = 0. We
denote by L the units of the productive technology that get transferred from
intermediaries to investors, in exchange for Lp units of the good (“liquidity”)
from investors to intermediaries in the interim period. This transaction can
be interpreted as asset sales, but is mainly referred to as “wholesale funding”
in the following.
The first-best maximization program is given by
max
(c1,c2,e0,e2,I,L,p)∈R7+
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2), (3.2)
subject to pic1 ≤ (1 + e0 − I) + Lp, (3.3)
(1− pi)c2 ≤ (I − L)R− e2, (3.4)
e2 ≥ ρe0 ≥ 0, (3.5)
R ≥ γp, (3.6)
pL ≤ A, (3.7)
I ≤ 1 + e0, (3.8)
L ≤ I. (3.9)
The budget constraints for periods one and two are given by (3.3) and
(3.4). Investors may transfer Lp to consumers in t = 1 in exchange for L
units in t = 2. As indicated above, we refer to this as wholesale funding. (3.5)
represents the participation constraint of the intermediary and non-negativity
constraint, and (3.6) represents the participation constraint of investors. The
resource constraint on investors’ capital A (“interim liquidity”) in the interim
period is given by (3.7). Finally, (3.8) and (3.9) denote the constraint on
initial investment as well as the constraint on the units of assets that can be
sold in the interim period.
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The constraint (3.9) cannot be binding because the Inada conditions require
that c2 > 0 and thus L < I. The two budget constraints are always bind-
ing. Furthermore, the participation constraint of intermediaries must also
be binding. Moreover, e0 > 0 cannot be optimal. Because ρ > R, we can
reduce e0 and thus relax the second-period constraint. It therefore follows
that e∗0 = e∗2 = 0. Because the intermediaries’ required return is higher than
the asset return, intermediaries’ funds are not used for intermediation in the
first-best. As we will see below, moral hazard may make it necessary to force
the intermediary to invest some of his endowment.
Let us now turn towards the use of interim liquidity, i.e., wholesale fund-
ing in period 1. In the first-best, it also has to hold that the participation
constraint of investors is binding. Whenever p < R/γ and pL < A, we can
increase p and thereby relax the period 1 constraint. Whenever p < R/γ
and pL = A, we can increase p and decrease L as much as necessary, thereby
relaxing the period 2 constraint. Therefore, it holds that p = R/γ.
We are now left with a maximization problem with two weak inequalities.
max
(c1,c2,I,L)∈R4+
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2), (3.10)
subject to pic1 = (1− I) + LR/γ, (3.11)
(1− pi)c2 = (I − L)R, (3.12)
LR/γ ≤ A, (3.13)
I ≤ 1. (3.14)
Depending on the model parameters A,R, γ, and pi, as well as on the shape
of the utility function, the first-best program now has three solution candi-
dates. As discussed in detail in the appendix, investment in storage is only
optimal if A is small, and becomes unnecessary when A is sufficiently large.
For the remaining part of this chapter, we will assume that we are in the
case in which the endowment of the investors A is large enough such that the
investors’ budget constraint (3.13) is not binding. In this case, storage is not
used, and there is only investment in the productive technology, i.e., I∗ = 1.
This translates into the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1. A ≥ ξ ≡ piγ− 1η R
(1−pi)+piγ1− 1η
.
For a detailed discussion of the implications of Assumption 3.1, see Ap-
pendix 3.A, in which we also characterize the the first-best for the case that
investors’ capital is scarce. Assumption 3.1 allows us to focus on a setup where
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intermediation optimally relies exclusively on investors providing interim liq-
uidity through wholesale funding and refrains from the use of storage.
Lemma 3.1 (First-best allocation). The first-best allocation is characterized
by
I∗ = 1, L∗ = ξγ/R, and e0 = e2 = 0,
and the optimal consumption profile is given by
c∗1 = γ−
1
η
R
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
and c∗2 =
R
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
. (3.15)
The risk-sharing between early and late consumers is described by the FOC
u′(c1) = γu′(c2) because under wholesale funding, the technological rate of
substitution between period 1 and 2 is given by the investors’ required return
γ. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) restrict attention to utility functions with a
relative risk aversion larger one. In their setup, risk-sharing between patient
to impatient consumers is optimal, implying that cDD1 > 1, where 1 is the
technological rate of return between periods 0 and 1 (storage). However,
this condition also enables self-fulfilling runs. In contrast, we focus on the
special case of constant relative risk aversion. The parameter of relative risk
aversion is constant and given by η > 1. We get a similar result with respect
to risk-sharing: It holds that c∗1 > R/γ, where R/γ is the rate of return
between periods 0 and 1 under wholesale funding. But as we shall see in
next subsection, this condition also has similar and important implications
for fragility and self-fulfilling runs.
Lemma 3.5 in the Appendix describes the first-best if Assumption 3.1 does
not hold. For A < ξ, the investors’ endowment constraint (3.13) becomes
binding. Furthermore, there exists some threshold ξ0 < ξ below which partial
investment in storage becomes optimal. In the extreme case of γ = R or
A = 0, the optimal consumption profile is identical to that in the Diamond
and Dybvig model with CRRA utility, which is thus nested in our model.
3.3.2 Intermediary Implementation
In the following, we will show that the first-best allocation can be implemented
by demand-deposit contracts offered by the intermediaries. We first show that
consumers are willing to lend to intermediaries, although intermediaries have
the option of investing in the shirking technology. We will show that the
demand-deposit contracts allow depositors to discipline the intermediary. In
74
3.3 Optimal Intermediation and Runs
a second step, we show that the disciplining element of the demand-deposit
contract is associated with financial fragility in the sense that panic-based
runs may take place in the interim period.
Disciplining Demand-Deposit Contracts
We assume that consumers cannot invest in the technologies directly, but only
via intermediaries. Let us first consider the agency problems on the part of
the intermediary. To this end, let us first devote more attention to the timing
and the action space of consumers and intermediaries.8
A consumer can choose whether and where to deposit her endowment in
period 0, and an intermediary can then choose how to invest this endowment
on her behalf. In period 1, consumers learn their type and observe the in-
termediary’s investment choice from the initial period, and they can decide
whether to withdraw based on this information.
Let us assume that competition among intermediaries forces them offer to
the first-best demand-deposit contract (c∗1, c∗2) in exchange for the consumers’
endowment. In period 1, consumers have the possibility to withdraw the
promised amount of c∗1, or to wait until period 2. We have assumed that
an intermediaries investment decision Ishirk is not observable in t = 0, but
becomes publicly observable before consumers make their withdrawal decision
in t = 1.
Proposition 3.1 (Implementation of the first-best: demand-deposit con-
tracts). There exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which the first-
best consumption profile (c∗1, c∗2) is implemented by the intermediaries offering
demand-deposit contracts.
Consider the following strategy of a consumer for the period-1 subgame: She
withdraws if she turns out to be impatient or if the intermediary has chosen
Ishirk > 0, and she does not withdraw if she turns out to be patient and the
intermediary has chosen Ishirk = 0. We will now show that if all consumers
use this strategy, this strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the
period-1 subgame for any investment decision of the intermediary, and the
optimal strategy of the intermediary is to choose Ishirk = 0.
Assume that the intermediary has chosen Ishirk > 0. Because all other
consumers withdraw, it is a best response to do so as well because the inter-
mediary is illiquid and insolvent already in t = 1. Notice further that if Ishirk
8Notice that in case of unsecured wholesale funding, one would have to worry about the
behavior of investors as well; compare Chapter 1. However, for the case of asset sales
or collateralized lending, we do not have to worry about the investors’ behavior as long
as they cannot collude in order to extract rents from consumers.
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is large enough, withdrawing actually becomes a dominant strategy because
the intermediary will be illiquid and insolvent in t = 2 even without a run.
Now assume the intermediary has only invested in the productive technol-
ogy, i.e., I = 1 and Ishirk = 0. Given that only impatient consumers withdraw,
the intermediary will be able to serve all early consumers by selling L∗ units
of her investment to investors. Because A ≥ ξ = pic∗1 by assumption, the
investors’ funds are sufficient to serve all early depositors. As c∗2 > c∗1, it is a
best response for patient consumers to wait.
This withdrawal strategy is a credible punishment strategy, and it uses
the threat of a bank run as a disciplining device: Because the intermediary
anticipates that all consumers will withdraw in t = 1 whenever she invests
in the shirking technology, she knows that she will not be able to enjoy the
private benefit B. Therefore, she does not invest in the shirking technology
in the first place. This disciplining effect of short-term debt is reminiscent of
the findings of Calomiris and Kahn (1991), and Diamond and Rajan (2001),
and allows intermediaries to implement the first-best allocation via demand-
deposit contracts.
Note that there also exists a continuum of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
in which the bank chooses to invest a positive fraction in the shirking technol-
ogy, but is not disciplined by the depositors up to this fraction. We discuss
such equilibria in the Appendix 3.B. In the following, we restrict attention to
the equilibrium proposed above. This is equivalent to assuming that an inter-
mediary can only exclusively invest in either the productive or the shirking
technology.
3.3.3 Fragility
While short-term debt is disciplining in our model, it is also a source of
fragility. In fact, the model exhibits multiple equilibria in the period-1 sub-
game. Depending on the amount of investors’ funds A, qualitatively differ-
ent run equilibria emerge. As long as the amount of funds A is sufficiently
large, potential runs on some intermediaries do not affect other intermedi-
aries. However, if the endowment of investors A is relatively small, liquidity
can become scarce in case of a run on many intermediaries. This puts the
market for liquidity under stress and deteriorates the funding conditions of
other intermediaries.
The price p of assets sold in period 1 depends on the aggregate amount L of
assets sold if and only if the investors’ resource constraint becomes binding.
As long as the resource constraint is not binding, competition among investors
ensures that the price is equal to the investors’ willingness to pay. Thus, if
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A is so large such that L units of the asset can purchased by investors at
price p = R/γ, this is the market-clearing price, i.e., the price is equal to the
assets’ rate of return R divided by the rate of the investors’ outside option
γ. If, however, A is scarce relative to the amount L of assets sold (i.e., if
A is not sufficient to purchase L units at price R/γ), the market clears via
cash-in-the-market pricing, i.e., it must hold that pL = A.
Given L, the amount of assets sold, the price of the assets in period 1 is
given by
p(L) =

R
γ if A
γ
R ≥ L
A
L if A
γ
R < L.
(3.16)
Recall that by Assumption 3.1, we restrict our attention to the case in which
intermediaries exclusively invest in the productive technology, i.e., I∗ = 1, so
the amount of assets sold is at most one. The price for assets in period 1 is
depicted in Figure 3.2 for the case that A < R/γ.
0
0
R/γ
A
p(L)
Lξγ/R
(= L∗)
Aγ/R I∗ = 1
Figure 3.2: This graph depicts the potential fire-sale price for the case R/γ > A.
In this case, a run may lead to depressed fire-sale prices via the binding cash-in-the-
market constraint.
As long as A ≥ R/γ, liquidity cannot become scarce, and the price is
always given by R/γ. However, if A < R/γ, runs on some intermediaries can
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have negative external effects on others. If sufficiently many intermediaries
experience a run, the price p gets depressed, thus deteriorating the refinancing
condition of other intermediaries.
Micro-Fragility: Runs on Single Institutions
Let us start by considering the stability of a single intermediary. Notice
that, on the one hand, the price on the secondary market is limited by the
investors’ willingness to pay, i.e., p ≤ R/γ, but, on the other hand, the optimal
demand-deposit contract promises an early consumption level that is strictly
larger than this amount, c∗1 > R/γ. Because p < c∗1, it holds true that if
all depositors of one specific intermediary i run, this intermediary has to sell
all assets, but still cannot fulfill all her obligations to her depositors. This
particular intermediary becomes illiquid and insolvent already in period 1, and
in particular could not serve any late consumer. Thus, a run on intermediary
i constitutes an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2 (Single-institution runs). Assume that intermediaries choose the
first-best investment level and demand-deposit contract. There exists a Nash
equilibrium in the period-1 subgame in which there is a run on some intermedi-
ary i, inducing a complete asset sale and immediate illiquidity and insolvency
of this intermediary. In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which there
is a run on all intermediaries.
Notice that the run on a mass j of intermediaries does not necessarily affect
the remaining mass 1− j of other intermediaries. If there is sufficient investor
capital A, the price on the market remains high enough to make it possible
that there exists an equilibrium where some mass j of intermediaries face
a run, but the rest does not face a run. The reason is that if A is large
enough and if (conditional on A) the mass j of intermediaries who face a
run is sufficiently low, the price in the secondary market is high enough to
make “prudent” behavior at the intermediaries 1−j compatible in equilibrium
with runs elsewhere. Nonetheless, it may be true that all intermediaries are
experiencing a run at the same time.
Macro-Fragility: Systemic Runs and Cash-in-the-market-pricing
Notice first that, if A > R/γ, it holds that p(L) = R/γ for all L. This means
that even in case of an economy-wide run, the price on the secondary market
is unaffected and there is no binding cash-in-the-market constraint. This also
implies, that if all intermediaries except for i had a run, this run would not
affect i at all, because it can sell the designated amount L∗ at the expected
price p = R/γ, so it could refinance at the ex-ante expected conditions.
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Now consider the case of A < R/γ. This implies that there is cash-in-
the-market pricing in case of an economy-wide run, implying that p(1) = A.
Thus, if all intermediaries but one are experiencing a run, the intermediary
who is not experiencing a run will yet face deteriorated funding conditions.
We refer to runs as “systemic runs” if they induce cash-in-the-market pricing
and thus affect the overall funding conditions.
Proposition 3.2 (Systemic runs). Assume that A < Rγ , and assume that
intermediaries choose the first-best investment level and demand-deposit con-
tract. Then there exist “systemic runs”, i.e., an economy-wide run in the
period-1 subgame leads to cash-in-the-market pricing and thus a deterioration
of overall funding conditions.
Proposition 3.1 shows that the ability to withdraw early induces diligent be-
havior of the intermediary, so short-term debt has a disciplining effect in our
model. However, there always exist multiple equilibria. In one class of equi-
libria, only some single institutions experience runs while others do not, and
the latter ones remain completely unaffected. From Lemma 3.2 we learn that
runs are always possible (on single institutions, but also economy-wide runs).
However, the runs on single institutions occur independently. From Proposi-
tion 3.2 we learn that runs are contagious via deteriorated funding conditions
only if A < R/γ, i.e., if investor capital is scarce. Whenever A < R/γ, there
exists a second class of equilibria, in which runs also become contagious in
the sense that they affect funding conditions of other institutions. The second
type of run will be particularly important when we analyze later how runs
in the shadow banking sector may affect funding conditions for the regulated
banking sector.
Finally, it is important to notice that there is an implicit assumption un-
derlying the existence of systemic runs: Our model does not allow that funds
withdrawn at one shadow bank immediately re-enter the system as deposits at
another intermediary or via the secondary market. Without this restriction,
further frictions would be needed to explain systemic runs, such as frictions
in interbank trade as pointed out by Skeie (2008).
3.3.4 Financial Markets Implementation
Until this point, we have by assumption ignored the possibility of imple-
menting an allocation via a financial market instead via intermediaries. The
allocation that can be attained via a financial market in which consumers
invest in the technologies directly and trade with investors in t = 1, is
(cfm1 , cfm2 ) = (R/γ,R). This allocation, however, only coincides with the
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first-best if η → 1, i.e., if u(c) = ln(c). This is reminiscent of the result of
Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Nonetheless, we need to make the investment restriction: If we allowed for
the coexistence of financial markets and intermediaries, the incentive to con-
duct side trading would destroy the ability to implement the first-best via
intermediaries, due to the same reasoning as in Jacklin (1987) and Farhi et
al. (2009). If intermediaries offered the first-best demand-deposit contract, a
consumer has an incentive to invest his endowment in the productive tech-
nology and consume the returns R > c∗2 if he turns out to be patient, and to
trade with a patient depositor otherwise, thereby consuming c∗1 units.
3.4 Deposit Insurance and Optimal Bank
Regulation
As we have seen in the previous section, the first-best is implementable
through non-regulated intermediaries, but this implementation is fragile in
the sense that there always exist run equilibria in the period-1 subgame. To
eliminate such panic-based bank runs, assume that the regulator provides a
credible deposit insurance:9 The regulator guarantees each bank depositor
that she will receive at least the amount in t = 2 that she was promised in
t = 1.
In a setup without aggregate uncertainty and with multiple equilibria, in-
troducing a deposit insurance that is credible may eliminate the adverse run
equilibrium at no cost, e.g., as discussed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
By guaranteeing patient consumers that they will get at least as much in
the final period than in the interim period, the strategic complementarity is
eliminated. Thus, the deposit insurance is never tested in equilibrium and is
costless.10
In our setup, however, a deposit insurance – if implemented without further
regulatory policy measures – can give rise to opportunistic behavior on the
part of intermediaries, which imposes costs on the provider of such deposit
9Alternatively, one could consider a lender of last resort, who grants access to the discount
window of the central bank in order to prevent panics. The role of the lender of last
resort is discussed in a later section.
10An alternative measure often discussed in the literature is to allow intermediaries to
suspend convertibility. One can easily see that the discussion below would be equiv-
alent under suspension of convertibility: suspension of convertibility may successfully
prevent panic-based runs, but also undermines the disciplining effect of demand deposit
contracts. If banks are able to suspend convertibility, regulation will also be necessary
to ensure diligent behavior of intermediaries.
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insurance. The reason is that in the presence of deposit insurance, consumers
do not care about the investment behavior of the intermediary, thus elimi-
nating the disciplining effect of short-term debt. Even if they know that the
intermediary will be insolvent in the second period, they do not run because
they know that the deposit insurance will pay them at least the amount that
the demand deposit contract entitles them to withdraw in the interim pe-
riod. Therefore, an intermediary may have incentives to invest in the shirking
technology.
Given the moral hazard problem arising from the deposit insurance, there
exists an optimal regulatory response. In the first-best, the intermediary does
not invest any of his funds in the intermediation business. The intermediary
has no skin in the game, and the participation constraint e2 ≥ ρe0 is trivially
satisfied by e0 = e2 = 0. This is efficient because there is no need to provide
the intermediary with incentives, and given ρ > R, it would be costly for
consumers to use the intermediary’s funds.
If a regulator wants to rule out moral hazard, she can do so by requiring the
intermediaries to hold junior claims on their intermediation business. Optimal
regulation thus calls for a minimal equity requirement via a classic skin-in-the-
game argument. To insure diligence, the incentive compatibility constraint of
the intermediary has to be satisfied. It is given by
e2 ≥ (1 + e0)B. (3.17)
At the same time, the intermediary’s participation constraint, e2 ≥ ρe0, still
needs to be fulfilled.
In the second-best, both constraints are binding, i.e., e2 = (1 + e0)B and
e2 = ρe0, yielding the second-best equity stakes
e∗∗0 =
B
ρ−B, and (3.18)
e∗∗2 =
ρB
ρ−B. (3.19)
Because it is costly to use intermediary’s funds, it holds that in an optimal
regulatory regime that tries to prevent the intermediary from investing in
the shirking technology, as little as possible intermediary capital is used, but
enough to ensure diligent behavior. Given this necessary equity level, we can
derive the second-best demand-deposit contract. The FOC is again given by
u′(c1) = γu′(c2).
Proposition 3.3 (Second-best contract). Assume that demand deposits are
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protected by a credible deposit insurance. Optimal bank regulation requires
intermediaries to satisfy an equity-to-debt ratio of B/(ρ − B), and interme-
diaries will hold exactly e∗0 = B/(ρ − B). There exists no run equilibrium in
the period-1 subgame. Given that ξ ≤ A, investment and sales are given by
I∗∗ = 1 + B
ρ−B and L
∗∗ = piγ
1− 1η
R
R− Bρ−B (ρ−R)
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
, (3.20)
and the optimal consumption is given by
c∗∗1 = γ−
1
η
R− Bρ−B (ρ−R)
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
and c∗∗2 =
R− Bρ−B (ρ−R)
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
. (3.21)
In the regime with a deposit insurance, the consumption levels are decreas-
ing in the private benefit B as well as in the required return of intermediaries
ρ. Obviously, first-best (Lemma 3.1) and second-best coincide if B = 0 or
ρ = R. For any other B > 0 and ρ > R, the second-best consumption levels
are strictly lower. In fact, the case of B > 0, but ρ = R, is very interesting.
In this case, using intermediary capital is not costly, and the first-best can
always be implemented by using intermediary capital and investing it in the
production technology until incentives are provided.
Importantly, there are no run equilibria in the interim period. The allocative
inefficiency comes with the benefit of financial stability. However, as we will
emphasize in the next section, this overall stability can only be attained if we
exclude the possibility of regulatory arbitrage.
3.5 Regulatory Arbitrage and Fragility
In the previous section, we have abstracted from the possibility of regulatory
arbitrage. In the following, we assume that the regulator provides a deposit in-
surance and regulates those intermediaries who are covered by the deposit in-
surance, hereafter referred to “commercial banks” or “regulated banks”. How-
ever, we assume that it is also possible for intermediaries to place themselves
outside of the regulatory perimeter of banking. Intermediaries who engage
in this kind of regulatory arbitrage are referred to as “shadow banks” in the
following. In this case, they will neither be regulated nor covered by the de-
posit insurance. However, shadow banks are disciplined in their investment
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behavior by demand-deposit contracts.11
In the following, we want to analyze a situation in which both regulated
commercial banks and shadow banks exist, and analyze how systemic risk that
emerges in the shadow banking sector can spread to the commercial banking
sector. In our model, the coexistence of regulated banking and shadow bank-
ing results from an additional assumption concerning the heterogeneity of
the depositors with regard to their “taste for commercial banking”, which we
model as a cost of moving to a shadow bank as in Luck and Schempp (2014a).
In period 0, consumers can choose whether to deposit their endowment
in a regulated bank or in a shadow bank. We assume that consumers do
not care about potential self-fulfilling runs on shadow banks, as runs are
considered to be zero-probability events. In a later section, we will relax this
assumption. Nonetheless, depositing at a shadow bank is assumed to come
at some opportunity cost. We assume that investors are initially located at
a regulated bank. For some consumer i, switching to a shadow bank comes
at a cost of si ∈ R+, where si is independently and identically distributed
according to the distribution function G. We assume that G is a continuous
function that is strictly increasing on its support R+, and that G(0) = 0.
The switching cost is assumed to enter into the investors’ utility additively
separable from the consumption utility.
This switching cost should not be taken literally. We have two preferred
interpretations in mind: First, one can think of si as a screening a cost or as
the cost of monitoring a shadow bank’s investment decision and thus ensuring
its diligent behavior. Alternatively, one can interpret si as the forgone service
benefits that depositors lose when leaving commercial banks, such as payment
services and ATMs. Both types of costs are likely to be heterogeneous across
the population of depositors. It may be relatively more costly to monitor for
a consumer that deposits only a small amount with the intermediary than for
a firm that deposits larger sums. Likewise, consumers may care more about
the payment services that banks provide.
As above, it is important to notice that the subsequent analysis also relies
on the assumption that funds withdrawn do not re-enter the system imme-
diately. Funds withdrawn at a shadow bank in t = 1 cannot be redeposited
at the regulated banking sector, nor can they be invested in the secondary
market. Thus, we assume that funds do not fully re-enter the banking system
11While by legal standards shadow banks have historically not offered demand deposits in
reality, they do issue claims that are essentially equivalent to demand deposits, such as
equity shares with a stable net assets value (stable NAV), or other instruments such
as asset-backed commercial papers or repurchase agreements. For tractability, we will
assume that shadow banks are literally taking demand deposits.
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immediately. This is equivalent to assuming that no frictionless transfer from
the shadow banking sector to the banking sector or to the secondary market
is possible.
Coexistence of Banks and Shadow Banks
First of all, consider the contracts that can be offered. A regulated bank will
offer a contract as discussed in Proposition 3.3, so the consumption levels
promised are given by (cb1, cb2) = (c∗∗1 , c∗∗2 ), where the superscript b stands for
bank. The expected utility of a bank customer is decreasing in B and ρ. A
shadow bank will offer the unconstrained contract described in Lemma 3.1, so
the consumption profile is given by (csb1 , csb2 ) = (c∗1, c∗2), where the superscript
sb stands for shadow bank.
When born, a consumer can decide whether he wants to remain at a bank,
or pay the switching costs and get the consumption profile of the shadow
banking contract. Thus, a consumer decides to become a customer of the
shadow bank if
U(csb1 , csb2 )− si ≥ U(cb1, cb2).
Let us define s∗(B, ρ) such that a consumer with switching cost si = s∗ is
indifferent between the two sectors, i.e.,
s∗ = U(csb1 , csb2 )− U(cb1, cb2). (3.22)
Lemma 3.3 (Size of shadow banking). The size of the shadow banking sector
is given by G(s∗). The cost threshold s∗ that makes consumers indifferent,
and thus also sector size G∗, is increasing in B and ρ. It holds that G∗ = 0 if
B = 0 or ρ = R.
The relative size of the two sectors is determined by the distribution G as
well as the two parameters B and ρ. The size of the shadow banking sector
increases with the threat of moral hazard (i.e., in the intermediaries’ private
benefits from shirking B) and in the cost of intermediary equity ρ.
Systemic Runs on Shadow Banks and Contagion
We are now equipped to derive conditions under which runs in the shadow
banking sector affect the consumption allocations in the regulated banking.
We show that if the shadow banking sector is large enough, it will induce cash-
in-the-market pricing and thus be contagious via a deterioration in funding
conditions for regulated banks.
Recall that csb1 ≥ R/γ. This implies that a run on one individual shadow
bank constitutes an equilibrium independent of the amount of investors’ cap-
ital A. That is, because the claims of all consumers withdrawing early cannot
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be satisfied via complete liquidation there can always be runs on single in-
stitution, compare Lemma 3.2. Moreover, a run on all shadow banks also
constitutes an equilibrium for the same reason. Such a run on all shadow
banks is not necessarily contagious. However, if the shadow banking sector is
sufficiently large, or the amount of investors’ capital too small, then the run
on shadow banks soaks up so much liquidity that the funding conditions for
commercial banks deteriorate.
We now analyze under which conditions a run on shadow banks leads to
cash-in-the-market pricing. Observe that, in case of a run on shadow banks,
the fire sale price of assets is given by
p(s∗) =

R/γ if G(s∗) ≤ g¯
A−(1−G(s∗))picb1
G(s∗) if G(s
∗) > g¯.
(3.23)
In case of a run on the shadow banking sector, all shadow banks try to
serve all withdrawing depositors. In order to fulfill their obligations, they sell
all their assets, i.e., the shadow banking sector sells a total amount of G(s∗)
units. As long as there is no cash-in-the-market pricing, shadow banks thus
absorb an amount of liquidity G(s∗)R/γ. However, this does not suffice to
serve all customers because csb1 > p ≥ R/γ. In addition, commercial banks
also need an amount [1 − G(s∗)]picb1 of liquidity to satisfy their withdrawing
impatient consumers. A run on shadow banks is not compatible with a price
p = R/γ (i.e., it leads to cash-in-the-market pricing) and thus has a negative
effect on regulated banks if the sum of these two terms exceeds the available
funds A.
Proposition 3.4 (Coexistence and runs on shadow banks). When regulated
banks and shadow banks coexist, a run on all shadow banks leads to cash-in-
the-market pricing whenever the shadow banking sector is large relative to the
budget of investors, specifically, if
G(s∗) > A− pic
b
1
R/γ − picb1
= g¯(A) > 0. (3.24)
In this case, the run also affects commercial banks because their funding con-
ditions deteriorate. There exists some threshold, g˜(A) > g¯(A), such that in
case of a run, regulated banks become insolvent if G(s∗) > g˜(A).
If A < R/γ, it holds that g¯(A) < 1, i.e., the price in a run decreases
whenever the shadow banking sector is large enough. Although regulated
banks cannot be subject to runs because they are covered by the deposit
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insurance, they are affected via a deterioration of their funding conditions as
the cash-in-the-market constraint becomes binding due to the runs on shadow
banks. That is, in case of a run on all shadow banks, the asset price in the
secondary market will be lower than initially expected. Thus, commercial
banks will have to refinance themselves at worse conditions than initially
expected. However, the banks’ equity cushion may be able to absorb these
losses. Given a relatively large shadow banking sector, the fire-sale price will
be so low such that banks become insolvent in t = 2, or already illiquid and
insolvent in t = 1. Importantly, this kind of contagion does not stem from
direct contractual linkages between the two sectors such as explicit or implicit
liquidity guarantees.
0
0
R/γ
A
pic∗∗1
p
G(s∗)g¯(A) 1
Figure 3.3: This graph depicts the fire-sale price in case of a run on all shadow
banks. A run leads to cash-in-the-market pricing and thus affects regulated banks if
G(s∗) > g¯(A).
In the previous section, we have shown that if there is deposit insurance
and regulation, but no regulatory arbitrage, it holds that the economy attains
an allocation which is inefficient compared to the first-best, but exhibits no
fragility. If we assume that regulatory arbitrage is possible, this may no longer
be true. Moreover, fragility is not contained in the shadow banking sector
only. Whenever the shadow banking sector is large relatively to the available
capital of investors, runs on shadow banks become possible and can affect
regulated banks via a deterioration of funding conditions. Importantly, the
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contagion operates only via the asset market and thus there can be contagion
even in the absence of any contractual linkages.
3.6 Wholesale Funding Restrictions
A natural question that arises in this context is whether limiting wholesale
funding of commercial banks can improve financial stability. In the following,
we analyze the most simple and the most extreme case: a complete prohibition
of wholesale funding for regulated banks, i.e., a restriction that L = 0 for
regulated banks. We show that this shuts down the contagion channel, but
the associated allocation is less efficient and implies a further growth of the
shadow banking sector.
The optimal consumption profile a bank can offer when wholesale funding is
prohibited is identical to the second best for the case of γ = R. In this latter
case, the bank could sell assets in the interim period, however, the return of
doing so is identical to using storage. The FOC is given by u′(c1) = Ru(c2).
Lemma 3.4. The constrained optimal allocation under the prohibition of
wholesale funding requires an investment of
Ir = 1 + B
ρ−B − pic
r
1,
and the consumption profile is given by
cr1 = R−
1
η
R− Bρ−B (ρ−R)
piR1−
1
η + (1− pi)
, and cr2 =
R− Bρ−B (ρ−R)
piR1−
1
η + (1− pi)
.
It holds that
U(cb1, cb2) > U(cr1, cr2).
Note that this optimal contract under the exclusion of wholesale funding
(cr1, cr2) coincides with the first-best allocation of the Diamond and Dybvig
model for B = 0 or ρ = R. However, this allocation is ont optimal in the
presence of investors that can provide liquid funds in the interim period.
Shadow banks still offer the same contract as above, i.e., (csb1 , csb2 ) = (c∗1, c∗2).
Given the switching cost si, let us define sr(B, ρ, L = 0) such that a consumer
with switching costs si = sr is indifferent between the two sectors, i.e.,
sr = U(csb1 , csb2 )− U(cr1, cr2). (3.25)
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One can directly see that the restrictions will shield regulated banks from the
adverse consequence of a run in the shadow banking sector, but that at the
same time they lead to a larger shadow banking sector in equilibrium. That
is, we will find that sr > s∗.
Proposition 3.5. Wholesale funding restrictions successfully shield regulated
banks from the adverse consequences of runs in the shadow banking sector.
However, the shadow banking sector is larger than without these restrictions,
G(sr) > G(s∗).
Wholesale funding restrictions, together with a deposit insurance, eliminate
the fragility altogether. They do, however, induce a further allocative inef-
ficiency by deteriorating the consumption profile of bank customers and by
pushing more depositors into the shadow banking sector.
3.7 Sunspot Runs in Shadow Banking
So far, we have assumed that runs on shadow banks are zero-probability
events. Clearly, if agents anticipated that such runs occur with a positive
probability, the expected utility from holding the same claim on the shadow
banking sector would be lower. However, we argue that while it does change
the incentive to switch to a shadow bank, it does not lead to a breakdown
of the shadow banking sector in general. As long as the probability of a run
is small, there is a positive mass of consumers who still prefer shadow banks
over regulated banks. Thus, the shadow banking sector shrinks, but continues
to have a positive size. Moreover, there is a second effect of systemic runs
that partially offsets the direct effect: Because systemic runs on shadow banks
worsen the wholesale funding conditions of regulated banks, runs on shadow
banks also worsen the expected consumption profile that regulated banks can
offer.
In order to illustrate the robustness of our results with regard to positive-
probability runs, we analyze a variant of the model in which a run on the
shadow banking sector occurs with an exogenous sunspot probability q, as
in Cooper and Ross (1998). In order to keep the analysis tractable, we as-
sume that the intermediaries are risk-neutral and that intermediaries’ equity
is sufficient to be completely loss-absorbing.
Observe that if q was high and the endowment of investors A was small,
shadow banks would at some point change their investment behavior by also
investing in storage.12 This would shield them against low fire-sale prices in
12Cooper and Ross (1998) show that if the physical liquidation rate is sufficiently high and
88
3.7 Sunspot Runs in Shadow Banking
case of a run. However, to keep things simple, we make the assumption that
A > 1 in this section. In this case, storage is still dominated by wholesale
funding for any q because A > 1 implies that even if we have cash-in-the-
market pricing, the price can never fall below 1. This in turn implies that
for any probability of a run on shadow banks q, shadow banks will not invest
in storage. It follows that the contract that is offered by shadow banks does
not depend on q, so it is still given by the contract (csb1 , csb2 ), as specified in
Section 3.5. If there is no run, the utility of a shadow bank customer is given
by U(csb1 , csb2 ). However, in case of a run, shadow banks will not be able to
satisfy this contract. In case of a run, shadow banks sell all assets at price
pr, and the consumers’ utility is given by u(pr). The utility of shadow bank
customers decreases in q because the probability of the unfavorable event
decreases directly, and because the price pr also decreases if shadow banks
are systemic (as we will see later).
Let us now consider the effect of sunspot runs on regulated banks. For
a sunspot probability q, let (cq1, cq2) denote the contract offered by regulated
banks, and let sq denote the level of switching cost that makes a consumer
indifferent between shadow banks and regulated banks. It is given by
sq = (1− q)U(csb1 , csb2 ) + qu(pr)− U(cq1, cq2). (3.26)
If the parameters are such that runs in the shadow banking sector are not
systemic for the case of q = 0 (i.e., if G(s∗) ≤ g¯, which is equivalent to the
situation of runs as zero-probability events, as discussed before), then it holds
that a positive bank-run probability does not affect regulated banks at all
either. If runs do not induce cash-in-the-market pricing in this case, they
will not induce cash-in-the-market pricing for positive q either. Regulated
banks can thus always receive wholesale funding at p = R/γ, so the contract
offered by regulated banks and the utility of bank customers is not changed.
However, if the run on shadow banks realizes, shadow bank customers only
get the proceeds from selling the assets, i.e., p = R/γ < c1sb. Thus, shadow
banking becomes unambiguously less attractive, and since the utility from
staying at a regulated bank is unchanged, and the size of the shadow banking
sector decreases.
We saw that the expected consumption utility of a shadow bank customer
(given by the first two terms) is decreasing in q. For G(s∗) < g¯, we saw
that the contract of commercial banks does not depend on q, so sq and thus
the probability for the sunspot run is also sufficiently high, banks will prefer to exclude
the possibility of sunspot runs by investing in storage.
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the size of the shadow banking sector, G(sq), shrinks in q. Now assume that
G(s∗) > g¯. If we now introduce the sunspot probability q, the expected utility
of a deposit contract offered by a regulated bank will decrease as well.
Assuming G(s∗) > g¯, it still holds true that the utility of shadow bank
customers decreases in q. However, because a run on shadow banks can be
systemic and induce cash-in-the-market pricing, the run also negatively af-
fects commercial banks. Because banks anticipate this, their optimal contract
changes and commercial banking also becomes less attractive. This reduces
the limiting effect of the positive probability of bank runs on the size of the
shadow banking sector.
Let us first consider the contract that banks are offering, given that a run
will hit the shadow banks with probability q. We have the two states, “run”
r and “no run” n. If no run occurs, the price in the secondary market is
pn = R/γ. In case of a run, the price is denoted by pr.
We assume that equity is completely loss-absorbing, i.e., the equity is suf-
ficient to buffer the losses in case of a run, and the bank can pay out the
amounts promised in the demand-deposit contract without having to use the
deposit insurance. Let e2 = qer2 + (1− q)en2 denote the expected payoff of the
intermediary in period 2. Binding IC and IR condition of intermediaries still
imply that e2 = ρBρ−B , and e0 =
B
ρ−B .
For each state i = n, r, the budget constraints are given by
picq1 = Lipi, and (3.27)
(1− pi)cq2 = (1 + e0)R− ei2 − LiR. (3.28)
The FOC is given by
u′(cq1) = u′(cq2)R
(1− q
pn
+ q
pr
)
. (3.29)
Note that, for q = 0, we get the well-known FOC u′(cq1) = γu′(cq2).
The positive probability of a bank run has two negative effects on bank cus-
tomers’ utility: First, it tightens the budget constraint because banks’ funding
conditions deteriorate in a run, but intermediaries’ participation constraint
still needs to be satisfied. For the same reason, the optimal marginal rate of
substitution between late and early consumption increases (see FOC), which
means that there will be less consumption smoothing. Thus, it holds that for
any sunspot probability q > 0, the bank contract (cq1, cq2) yields a lower utility
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than for the case of q = 0, which is given by (cb1, cb2):
U(cq1, cq2) < U(cb1, cb2). (3.30)
Thus, if we compare the utility that consumers get from commercial banks
and shadow banks, respectively, the direct effect of shadow bank runs on the
attractiveness of shadow banks is partly offset by an indirect effect on shadow
banks via the wholesale funding channel.
3.8 Liquidity Guarantees
Until this point, we have restricted attention to intermediaries becoming either
regulated banks or unregulated shadow banks. An interesting question is
how our results change when banks and shadow banks are interdependent not
only via effects on secondary markets, but if they are operated by the same
intermediary. This had been practice prior to the recent financial crisis, as
documented by Acharya et al. (2013), and has been targeted by post-crisis
reforms.
To this end, we analyze a version of our model in which intermediaries
operate a bank and a shadow bank at the same time. We investigate under
which conditions intermediaries may have incentives to use funds from their
regulated banking branch to support their shadow-banking activities in case
of distress. We will thus analyze the effect of explicit contractual linkages.
Private Optimality of Liquidity Guarantees
In the previous section, we assumed that an economy-wide run is a sunspot
phenomenon that occurs with a probability q. We will now again assume that
economy-wide runs occur with zero probability.
In contrast, we assume that shadow banks experience idiosyncratic sunspot
runs: With a probability qi, each individual shadow bank experiences a run.
However, we will assume that this probability is very small, i.e., qi → 0. This
allows us to keep the optimal contracts fixed. A commercial bank optimally
offers (cb1, cb2) as before, and a shadow bank (csb1 , csb2 ).
Given that there is a run on the shadow bank with probability qi, the inter-
mediary may now have an incentive to guarantee the liquidity of her shadow
bank to protect her from idiosyncratic runs. Observe that the possibility of
an idiosyncratic sunspot run can be eliminated if a regulated branch of an
intermediary provides a credible liquidity guarantee for its unregulated oper-
ations. Moreover, observe that it is optimal to provide this support guarantee
for each institution as it makes the offered contract more attractive and will
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thus attract more consumers.
The liquidity guarantee is credible if the bank can serve all its impatient
bank customers as well as all those who own a shadow bank contract by
selling all its assets. The regulated bank has conducted an initial investment
of (1−G(s∗))(1+e∗0) and the shadow banking an investment of G(s∗). In total,
the bank can thus raise R/γ(1 + (1 − G(s∗))e∗0). The funds raised by selling
all assets need to be sufficient to serve all impatient consumers, (1−G(s∗))cb1,
of the regulated bank and all consumers of the shadow bank, G(s∗)csb1 . A
liquidity guarantee is thus credible whenever
G(s∗) ≤ R/γ(1 + (1−G(s
∗))e∗0)− picb1
csb1 − picb1
A guarantee can thus only be credible if the shadow banking operations are
not too large compared to the regulated banking activities.
Systemic Runs
While it is optimal from the perspective of a single institution to provide
a liquidity guarantee, it leads to an increased parameter space for runs on
the aggregate level. In case of a run, commercial banks have to provide an
amount of G(s∗)csb1 to shadow banks. In addition, they require an amount of
(1 − G(s∗))picb1 to satisfy their own impatient customers. Therefore, a run is
systemic whenever G(s∗)csb1 + (1−G(s∗))picb1 > A.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that intermediaries can own a regulated bank and
a shadow bank at the same time and that liquidity guarantees are credible.
It is privately optimal for each intermediary to guarantee the liquidity for
her shadow bank branch by using funds from her regulated bank. In turn, this
decreases the threshold size above which the shadow banking becomes systemic:
A systemic run can now already occur and affect regulated banks if
G(s∗) ≥ A− pic
b
1
csb1 − picb1
< g¯(A).
Without liquidity guarantees, systemic runs are only possible if the shadow
banking sectors size exceeds g¯. With liquidity guarantees, this is already true
for a sector size of G(s∗) ≥ A−picb1
csb1 −picb1 . The underlying mechanism is as follows:
while liquidity guarantees are optimal from the individual intermediary’s per-
spective, they increase the number of assets sold in case of an unanticipated
economy-wide run. This shows that there is a clear benefit of preventing di-
rect contractual linkages via regulation, as it reduces the parameter space in
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which systemic runs may take place. However, as shown in the earlier section,
it may not be sufficient to rule out adverse effect for regulated banks entirely.
3.9 Lender of Last Resort and Market
Maker of Last Resort
So far, we have only considered a deposit insurance and capital regulation
as policy measures, and we have ignored other government interventions. In
practice, regulated banks also have access to the discount window of a central
bank (Lender of Last Resort, LoLR). Alternatively, the central bank may
decide to intervene in the secondary market in order to prevent cash-in-the-
market pricing (Market Maker of Last Resort, MMLR). We now want to ask
whether the possibility of such interventions may help to shield commercial
banks from turmoil in the shadow banking sector.
Assume that there is an institution called central bank that has unlimited
funds at its disposal in the interim period and can commit to being a LoLR
or a MMLR. In a richer setup that distinguishes between nominal and real
values, one could also consider potential costs of central bank interventions.
We abstract from such trade-offs in our analysis and briefly discuss them at
the end of this section.
Let us consider a central bank that acts as a LoLR or a MMLR, and analyze
the policy it would choose in order to protect regulated banks from systemic
crises. In our setup, a LoLR would intervene in case of a systemic crisis (i.e.,
if p < R/γ). Regulated banks would be allowed to use the discount window
to borrow funds, so they do not have to sell assets at fire-sale prices. If we
assume that the discount window lending has the same terms as the wholesale
funding in normal times, then LoLR effectively shields regulated banks from
turmoil in the shadow banking sector. Thus, banks can offer the second-
best contract even in the case of crises occurring with a positive probability.
However, shadow banks also benefit from such intervention, although they do
not have access to the discount window. Because regulated banks do not have
to sell their assets, fewer assets are on the market compared to a situation
without central bank intervention, implying that fire-sale prices are higher.
A MMLR in our setup could ensure that the price of assets is always equal
to R/γ by buying assets at this price in case of a systemic crisis. In con-
trast to the LoLR’s discount window lending, the MMLR conducts an open
market operation, and it appears plausible to assume that the MMLR cannot
selectively buy assets from regulated banks only. As in the case of the LoLR,
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regulated banks are again unaffected by runs in the shadow banking sector
and can offer the second-best. Shadow bank customers again benefit from the
intervention, and in this case even more than in case of a LoLR intervention
because the MMLR eliminates cash-in-the-market pricing altogether.
It is worth noticing that both the LoLR and the MMLR as discussed, are
effective in shielding regulated banks, but they do not prevent runs in the
shadow banking sector as the strategic complementary among consumers pre-
vails independent of the wholesale funding conditions.
Therefore, we conclude that, for both types of interventions, it holds true
that they make the shadow banking sector relatively more attractive in the
presence of positive probabilities for runs and thus lead to an increased shadow
banking sector; and this effect is more pronounced for the MMLR than for the
LoLR intervention. Still, a LoLR or a MMLR that shields regulated banks
from the adverse consequences of runs on shadow banks could be considered
as an alternative to restrictions on wholesale funding. However, as mentioned
above, our model is not suited to draw such conclusions in general, as we do
not consider the costs and potential distortions resulting from interventions.
While interventions have to be financed via taxation or inflation, there would
be a trade-off in a richer setup that allows to distinguish between nominal and
real values. Moreover, an ex-post intervention by a LoLR or a MMLR may
not always be desirable in richer setups because of other potential frictions,
e.g., if the government cannot distinguish between insolvent and illiquid banks
or if interventions give rise to moral hazard.
3.10 Liquidity Regulation in Basel III
In the following, we relate our findings to the regulatory treatment of liquid-
ity risk in the context of prudential regulation. Our model can shed light on
the economic consequences of liquidity regulation in the Third Basel Accord
(Basel III). Basel III introduces a new assessment and regulation of liquidity
risk by defining two minimum standards of funding liquidity, first described
in Basel Committee (2010). The two central measures are the Liquidity Cov-
erage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR
requirement aims to ensure that a bank can withstand a “significantly severe
liquidity stress scenario” with a horizon of 30 days and is described in detail in
Basel Committee (2013). It aims to ensure that a bank has a sufficient stock of
liquid assets in order to cover its liquidity needs during the next month. The
objective of the NSFR requirement, elaborated in Basel Committee (2014),
is to ensure stable funding over a one-year horizon. It requires a bank to
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have an amount of equity, long-term debt, and other “stable” funding that is
sufficient to finance its stock of illiquid assets during the next year.
Our model can be interpreted as an argument in favor of liquidity regulation:
it indicates that, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, regulated banks may
be affected by systemic liquidity crises originating in the shadow banking
sector. This in turn may call for a macroprudential regulation of liquidity
management whenever the regulator wants to shield regulated banks from
the adverse consequences of runs in the shadow banking sector. However, we
will now argue that it is important to use a macroprudential approach and in
the context of the proposed liquidity regulation in Basel III this would imply a
necessity for being more restrictive when defining which assets are considered
as liquid and which sources of funding are considered as stable.
In the following, we briefly summarize the Basel committee’s proposal for
liquidity regulation and analyze its implications in the context of our model.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
The LCR is defined as the ratio of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) and
the (hypothetical) total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days, and
Basel III requires this measure to be above 1.13 Thus, the LCR sets a lower
bound for the stock of liquid assets, conditional on a bank’s (expected) cash
flows. “Total net cash outflow” is defined as the maximum of “total expected
net cash outflow” and “25% of total expected cash outflow”. In this context,
“expected” denotes a scenario of a “combined idiosyncratic and market-wide
shock” that entails (among others) a partial run-off of retail deposits and
a partial reduction in unsecured wholesale funding and secured short-term
financing.
HQLA consist of two categories: Level 1 assets are cash, central bank re-
serves, and government bonds with 0% risk weight. Level 2 assets can again
be divided in two sub-categories, Level 2A and Level 2B assets. A minimum
haircut of 15% has to be applied to all Level 2 assets, which is supposed to
capture their devaluation in a crisis scenario. After applying this haircut,
Level 2 assets must not make up more than 40% of the whole stock of HQLA.
Level 2A assets include government bonds with risk weights below 20%, as
well as corporate debt securities (including commercial papers) and covered
bonds with a rating of at least AA-. Level 2B assets also include Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) with ratings of at least AA, corporate
debt securities with ratings of at least BBB-, and common equity shares which
are constituent of a major stock index. These assets are subject to a haircut
13For details on the LCR, see Basel Committee (2013).
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between 25% and 50% and must not make up more than 15% of the stock of
HQLA.14
In addition to these requirements, the Basel Committee specifies liquidity
requirements of eligible assets in the following way: Level 2 assets must be
“traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets charac-
terised by a low level of concentration [and] have a proven record
as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even
during stressed market conditions (ie maximum decline of price not
exceeding 10% or increase in haircut not exceeding 10 percentage
points over a 30-day period during a relevant period of significant
liquidity stress).”(Basel Committee, 2013).
The requirements for Level 2 assets are thus defined in terms of their past
and present liquidity. The underlying notion seems to be that an asset’s past
and present liquidity predicts its future liquidity. This is particularly evident
in the condition that an asset’s value must have been stable in a “period of
significant liquidity stress”.
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
As a second measure of liquidity regulation, Basel III requires the NSFR to be
above 1. The NSFR is defined as the ratio of available stable funding (AFS)
and required stable funding (RSF), both with a horizon of one year.15 Thus,
the NSFR sets a lower bound for the amount of stable funding, conditional
on a bank’s portfolio of illiquid assets and off-balance sheet exposures. The
ASF is defined in order to capture the “capital and liabilities expected to
be reliable over the time horizon [of] one year”. ASF comprises regulatory
capital, preferred stock, and liabilities with maturities of at least one year,
but also
Liabilities of the latter categories have to be multiplied by an ASF factor of
less than one. ASF aims to exclude unstable short-term funding, i.e., funding
that might quickly be withdrawn or not rolled over. It excludes short-term
wholesale funding, such as interbank lending, but includes retail deposits,
because deposit insurance is supposed to make deposits a source of stable of
funding.
RSF is a measure of a bank’s illiquid asset portfolio. It is defined as the
sum of the value of a bank’s assets, multiplied by a specific RSF factor that
should reflect an asset’s liquidity risk, plus a similarly weighted sum of the
bank’s off-balance sheet activities or potential liquidity exposures. An asset’s
14Note that they must also be included in the 40% cap of all Level 2 assets.
15For details on the NSFR, see Basel Committee (2014).
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Assets Liabilities
Liquid Assets
Illiquid Assets
Short-term Debt
Long-term Debt
Equity
HQLA
RSF
Net cash
outflow
ASF
Figure 3.4: Schematic representation of the bank balance sheet under the assump-
tion that LCR and NSFR have been defined for the same time horizon.
RSF factor is lower the more liquid this asset is. Cash and securities with
a maturity of less than one year have an RSF factor of 0%; other securities
and corporate bonds with good ratings have low, but positive RSF factors;
other bonds, mortgages and loans have higher RSF factors, and other assets
(particularly encumbered assets) have RSF factors of 100%.
The notion behind the NSFR requirement is that the ASF serves a bank
to finance its illiquid asset contained in the RSF in times of a liquidity crisis.
It is assume that those assets not contained in the RSF are liquid and can
thus be sold even in times of a crisis in order to compensate the “unstable”
funding that might disappear in a crisis.
Comparison and Discussion
Although the definitions of the LCR and NSFR appear quite different at first
sight, a closer look reveals that their time horizon and the rhetoric are the
only distinct differences. To illustrate this point, let us consider a stylized
bank balance sheet; see Figure 3.4. The bank’s assets can be divided into
a portfolio of liquid and a portfolio of illiquid assets, and the liability side
consists of short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity.
If we abstract from the different time horizons of the two liquidity measures,
we see that the illiquid assets count as RSF, and the liquid assets count as
HQLA. Which asset is considered to be liquid or illiquid is determined by
the scenario of stress that is specified by the regulator. On the liability side,
the stress scenario specifies which kind of funding is expected to disappear
and which is expected to stay during a crisis. The expected net cash outflow
measures the expected change in the bank’s short-term liabilities. The part of
short-term funding which (in the relevant scenario) is assumed not to disap-
pear, together with long-term debt and equity, forms the ASF. Because total
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liabilities equal total assets, the LCR and the NSFR requirements are equiv-
alent: HQLA exceed expected net cash outflow if and only if ASF exceeds
RSF. It follows that the two measures only vary in their time horizon.
Both the LCR and the NSFR requirement are part of a micro-prudential
regulatory approach. They aim to guarantee the liquidity of a single financial
institution, but while they may assure that banks survive in normal times or in
times of mild or idiosyncratic stress, it is questionable whether the underlying
stress scenario is severe enough to capture potential systemic crises of a self-
fulfilling nature.
Our model suggests that liquidity regulation may in general be considered as
a useful tool. According to our model, liquidity regulation can be particularly
useful if it has a macroprudential focus that allows shielding regulated banks
from financial distress events that lie outside the regulated banking sector
(compare Proposition 3.5). However, our model also indicates that we should
use a macroprudential approach when it comes to defining what assets are
considered to be liquid and which sources of funding are considered as stable.
With regard to the definition of HQLA, we argue that Level 2 assets in
particular may not be very helpful in case of systemic liquidity crises. In our
model, assets that are based on the productive technology can be traded in
the interim period. In fact, these assets are traded at p = R/γ in normal
times. Moreover, even if some part of the financial system is in turmoil, the
price may remain unaffected (as argued in Lemma 3.2 and in Proposition 3.4).
This suggests that a real-life counterpart of the long asset in our setup could
qualify as a Level 2 asset. However, in a systemic liquidity crisis, fire sales
may depress the market value of these assets. This results from the fact that,
in a setup with multiple equilibria, assets may be seemingly safe and the value
might drop substantially and in a fashion that is not predictable by their past
performance.
We further argue that the ASF may be too broad and, in particular, that
short-term wholesale funding cannot be considered as a stable source of fund-
ing. While insured demand-deposits can be considered as stable funding, this
does not apply to short-term wholesale funding. As our model indicates, the
conditions of wholesale funding may be stable in normal times and even in
case of stress events of parts of the financial system. However, they are not
stable in case of a systemic liquidity crisis.
We thus argue that liquidity regulation as in Basel III may in principle be a
useful tool to shield commercial banks from adverse consequences of turmoil
that takes place outside the regulated banking sector. However, we argue
that its focus is rather microprudential and it is thus not suited to deal with
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systemic crises. Consequentially, if we take our model seriously, the definition
of HQLA and ASF should be tightened such that they are suited to deal with
systemic liquidity crises.
3.11 Conclusion
This chapter provides a banking model in which intermediation optimally re-
lies on wholesale funding next to funding via demand deposits. We show that
in an unregulated banking environment, short-term debt has a disciplining
role, but panic-based runs are also possible. If a safety net is in place to
eliminate the possibility of panic-based runs, regulation becomes necessary.
This in turn leads to the emergence of an unregulated and fragile shadow
banking sector. We then show that because regulated banks optimally rely
on wholesale funding, runs on shadow banks are contagious via a deteriora-
tion of the wholesale funding conditions. Therefore, turmoil in the shadow
banking sector may affect the commercial banking sector even in the absence
of any contractual linkages between the two sectors.
We emphasize two main findings of our analysis: The ideal policy measure
would be to prevent the circumvention of regulation altogether. In the con-
text of our model, this would allow a constrained-efficient allocation to be
attained for in which financial stability is ensured by deposit insurance, and
diligence is ensured through capital requirements. However, if regulatory ar-
bitrage cannot be prevented altogether, attaining stability becomes difficult.
One can consider ring-fencing the part of the banking sector that is covered by
deposit insurance. However, besides prohibiting direct contractual linkages,
one would then have to restrict or prohibit wholesale funding altogether. Yet,
for such restrictions to be effective in fulfilling their macro-prudential objec-
tive, they need to be sufficiently strict. Moreover, achieving financial stability
in the regulated banking sector by restrictions on wholesale funding can only
be achieved at the cost of allocative inefficiency and a larger shadow banking
sector.
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Appendix 3.A First-Best
As discussed in the text, we are left with a maximization problem with two
weak inequalities.
max
(c1,c2,I,L)∈R4+
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2), (3.31)
subject to pic1 = (1− I) + LR/γ, (3.32)
(1− pi)c2 = (I − L)R, (3.33)
LR/γ ≤ A, (3.34)
I ≤ 1. (3.35)
Let us define the following thresholds:
ξ ≡ γ− 1η piR
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
< R/γ, (3.36)
and
ξ0 ≡ piR
− 1η
(1− pi) + piR− 1ηγ
< ξ, (3.37)
Depending on the model parameters A,R, γ, and pi, as well as on the shape
of the utility function, the first-best program now has three solution candi-
dates.
Lemma 3.5 (First-best). If A ≥ ξ, then the first-best allocation is character-
ized by
I∗ = 1 and L∗ = ξγ/R,
and optimal consumption is given by
c∗1 = γ−
1
η
R
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
and c∗2 =
R
(1− pi) + piγ1− 1η
. (3.38)
For A ∈ (ξ0, ξ), we have that
I∗ = 1 and L∗ = Aγ/R, (3.39)
and optimal consumption is given by
c∗1 =
A
pi
and c∗2 =
R− Aγ
(1− pi) . (3.40)
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Finally, if A ≤ ξ0, then the first-best allocation is characterized by
I∗ = (1− pi)(1 + A) + piR
− 1ηAγ
(1− pi) + piR− 1η
and L∗ = Aγ/R, (3.41)
and optimal consumption is given by
c∗1 = R−
1
η
R + (R− γ)A
(1− pi) + piR− 1η
and c∗2 =
R + (R− γ)A
(1− pi) + piR− 1η
. (3.42)
In the first case (A ≥ ξ), it holds that I∗ = 1 and L∗ < 1, and the optimal
allocation is characterized by
u′(c1) = γu′(c2) (3.43)
pic1γ + (1− pi)c2 = R. (3.44)
In the third case (A < ξ0), we have L∗ = Aγ/R, and I∗ < 1, and the optimal
allocation is characterized by
u′(c1) = Ru′(c2) (3.45)
pic1R + (1− pi)c2 = R + (R− γ)A. (3.46)
Appendix 3.B Shirking Equilibria
We have stated above that in a subgame where the intermediary has chosen
Ishirk = 1, it is the dominant strategy of all consumers to withdraw their
funds early, so this constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
This illustrates the potential for short-term debt to be disciplining. Because
the intermediary enjoys the benefit only when he does not experience a bank
run in the interim period, there exists a run strategies in which consumers
credibly threaten to punish any shirking. Thus, there exists a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in which the intermediary does not shirk, but implements
the first-best.
However, as we pointed out in the main text, there also exist subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria in which that short-term debt is only partially disci-
plining. In fact, some investment in the shirking technology may be tolerated
by depositors before they run. The reason is that if the intermediary has
chosen some Ishirk ≥ 0 that is small enough, “running” is not the dominant
strategy.
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In order to illustrate this, assume that Rshirk = 0. Assume the contract
(c∗1, c∗2) has been promised. We can ask what level of Ishirk the intermediary
can choose before consumers will run, irrespectively of the behavior of other
in the interim period. We have that the following two budget constraints
hold:
pic∗1 = LR/γ
(1− pi)c2 = (1− Ishirk)R− LR
Consumers will run after observing Ishirk whenever c2 < c1. That is, whenever
c2 =
1
1− pi
(
(1− Ishirk)R− pic
∗
1γ
R
)
< c∗1
⇔ Ishirk > 1− c
∗
1(1− pi) + pic∗1γ/R
R
≡ Ix
Therefore, there exist multiple subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies which differ in the extent of the discipline that they ensure. In
particular, for any Ψ ∈ [0, Ix], there exist an equilibrium in which each con-
sumer runs if and only if Ishirk > Ψ, and intermediaries choose Ishirk = Ψ. In
the main part of our analysis, we ignore such equilibria, which is equivalent
to assuming that the intermediaries can only invest in either the productive
or the shirking technology, i.e., IShirk ∈ {0, 1}.
Appendix 3.C Second-Best
In the presence of equity regulation, the second-best is the solution of the
maximization problem of the first-best subject to the equity requirement. If
the investors’ capital A is not scarce (i.e., if pL < A), it also holds that L < I,
and the following constraints are binding:
pic1 = (1 + e0 − I) + Lp,
(1− pi)c2 = (I − L)R− e2,
e0 =
B
ρ−B,
e2 = ρe0,
p = R/γ,
I = 1 + e0,
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The maximization problem is reduced to
max
(c1,c2,L)
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2),
subject to pic1 = LR/γ,
(1− pi)c2 = (1 + e0 − L)R− ρe0,
e0 =
B
ρ−B.
As the utility function is characterized by CRRA with the RA-parameter
η, the FOC can be rewritten as
c1 = γ−
1
η c2,
and the period budget equations yield the following consumption levels:
c1 =
RL
piγ
, and
c2 =
1
1− pi [(1 + e0 − L)R− ρe0] ,
and Proposition 3.3 follows.
Appendix 3.D Wholesale Funding
Restrictions
In the case that wholesale funding is prohibited, commercial banks can only
offer an allocation where liquidity is provided by investing in storage as in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The optimal allocation is the solution of the
following problem:
max
(c1,c2,I)
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2), (3.47)
subject to pic1 = (1 + e0 − I), (3.48)
(1− pi)c2 = IR− ρe0, (3.49)
e0 =
B
ρ−B. (3.50)
We see that if we set ρ = R in the second-best problems, the two optimiza-
103
Chapter 3 Regulatory Arbitrage and Systemic Liquidity Crises
tion problems are identical in terms of the consumption allocation they imply,
and it holds that
L∗∗ = (1 + e0 − Ir), (3.51)
i.e., the amount of assets sold in the second-best L∗∗ and the investment in
storage under wholesale funding restrictions are equal.
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